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ABSTRACT 
 
“Encouraging action during overdose events – the good, the bad, and the barriers” 
 
by 
 
THOMAS E. GRINER 
 
April 17, 2019 
 
INTRODUCTION:   Timely medical attention could decrease mortality following drug or 
alcohol overdose events, but overdose victims and witnesses often delay or fail to seek 
professional help because they fear police involvement.  Statutes that provide immunity from 
criminal action may have an important impact on the likelihood of seeking timely treatment.  As 
overdose deaths have increased despite legislative attempts to encourage contacting authorities 
during overdoses, other measures should be considered.  In Georgia, recent legislation should 
make opioid antagonist products like naloxone more accessible to the public.   
METHODS:   The first paper systematically analyzes variability in Medical Amnesty Laws (or 
“Good Samaritan Laws”) across states that are designed to encourage bystanders and others to 
contact authorities for assistance during overdose emergencies.  The second paper examines drug 
poisoning death rates in states with five years of data available after enactment of Medical 
Amnesty Laws (MALs) to determine whether drug poisoning death rates have decreased.  The 
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third paper utilizes a randomized survey of pharmacies across Georgia to report on barriers that 
exist for the purchase of naloxone by the public. 
 
RESULTS: Forty-six states plus the District of Columbia have MALs, but provisions differ 
widely in scope.  Some laws may not meet legislative goals because they lack protections, allow 
broad prosecutorial discretion, or are difficult to research, assimilate, and understand.  Of the 
nine states with five years’ experience with MALs, only Washington’s drug poisoning death 
rates have not increased.  Statistical analyses failed to find an association between MALs and 
drug poisoning deaths.  Among Georgia pharmacies surveyed, only half had naloxone in stock, 
with prices ranging from $65.00 to $201.00.  Approximately one-half of pharmacy 
representatives misstated that a physician’s prescription was required to purchase naloxone, 
despite a Standing Order and changes in Georgia law that removed this formerly mandated 
requirement.  
CONCLUSIONS: Overdose immunity laws prove to be complex and may not be easily 
understood by the general population, making them less effective in reaching statutory goals.  In 
Georgia, certain barriers to the purchase of naloxone persist despite recent legislative changes, 
making it less likely that those who may need a safe, easily administered form of naloxone will 
obtain the product. Findings from this research reveal an important opportunity to understand 
how policy goals can be more strongly aligned with diverse stakeholder groups’ knowledge, 
needs, and interests - from professionals to the public.   
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CHAPTER 1 – LITERATURE REVIEW AND STATEMENT OF PURPOSE  
   
 
Over the past 20 years, the increased availability of controlled prescription drugs (CPDs) 
and inexpensive heroin has led to a dramatic increase in overdose deaths in the U.S.    Since 
2008, drug overdoses have killed more people each year in the U.S. than either motor vehicle 
crashes or the misuse of firearms.  (The U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency, 2015)  Despite leading 
in many areas of medical technology, the U.S. has the highest drug-related mortality rate in the 
world (Cochran et al., 2014).   
While street drugs posed the greatest risk of overdose for past generations, since 2002, 
CPD abuse has resulted in more deaths than cocaine and heroin combined.  However, increased 
law enforcement pressure on the diversion of CPDs from legitimate channels has prompted drug 
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cartels to increase the supply of heroin and other illicit drugs to the American market (The U.S. 
Drug Enforcement Agency, 2015).  Today, heroin is more readily available and drives more 
overdose deaths than in 2007 (The U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency, 2015).  
Heroin carries well-known risks, and overdoses occur frequently among its users.  
Research of illicit drug use conducted by Tracy and colleagues, found that approximately one-
half (50%) of respondents had a minimum of one non-fatal drug overdose event (Tracy et al., 
2005). Among intravenous drug users, those experiencing a non-fatal overdose has ranged 
between 50% and 70% (Warner-Smith, Darke, Lynskey, & Hall, 2001).  Moreover, those who 
quit using heroin have a much higher likelihood of overdose if they renew usage, because 
tolerance levels usually diminish (The U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency, 2015).   
Whether a lethal opioid overdose involves CPDs or street drugs, the time from initial 
injection or consumption to death may leave a one-to-three (1 – 3) hour window for an overdose 
witness to intervene and seek medical attention for the victim (Enteen et al., 2010).  Naloxone 
(Narcan ®), the first therapeutic drug overdose reversal agent, is easy to administer and is 
commonly used by medical professionals to counteract the effects of heroin and other opiates 
(Sporer & Kral, 2007).   
Some states permit the dissemination of Naloxone to drug users’ family members, 
friends, and others who may be in the best position to respond directly to witnessed overdose 
events (Davis & Carr, 2015; Galea et al., 2006; Phillips, 2013; Seal et al., 2003; Sporer & Kral, 
2007).  While effective in many cases, this approach is not without potential problems.  Because 
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Naloxone is generally safe and effective against opioid based overdoses, some may rely too 
much on its ameliorating effects and fail to seek professional help following an overdose.  
Further, Naloxone is only effective with opioid-based overdoses.  Overreliance on Naloxone or 
simply not knowing what drugs are taken by a victim could prove disastrous with a poly-drug 
overdose or when the overdose agent is not an opioid, because Naloxone does not ameliorate the 
effects of non-opioid drugs or alcohol.  Naloxone may also be perceived as a “safety net” which 
enables opioid drug users to take risks with dosage levels.  
Like many states Georgia’s drug overdose death rates have risen each year.  From 2010 
to 2017, Georgia’s overall drug poisoning deaths increased by 52%, while the population 
increased 7.6%. 
i
   The characteristics of Georgia’s drug overdose deaths have also changed.  The 
percentage of opioid-related deaths among all drug overdose deaths increased from 40.1% in 
2010 to 64.4% in 2017 (see Appendix Table 1).  Drug poisoning deaths are also distributed 
unevenly across Georgia: out of 159 counties, 42 reported higher poisoning death rates than the 
national average during 2008 - 2014.  Georgia’s most populous 20 counties account for more 
than 50% of all statewide drug poisoning deaths.   
Some states allow police officers, paramedics, and first responders to carry and 
administer Naloxone to avoid the delay in treatment that would otherwise occur while 
transporting an overdose victim to a hospital.  While published research has demonstrated the 
effectiveness of this approach (Banta-Green, Beletsky, Schoeppe, Coffin, & Kuszler, 2013), 
other studies show that emergency medical services (EMS) are activated in fewer than half of 
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overdose events (Seal et al., 2003; Sporer, 1999; Warner-Smith et al., 2001).  The low rate of 
EMS activation occurs in part because witnesses to overdose are often drug abusers themselves, 
and fear legal consequences such as arrest and prosecution for drug offenses, violations of 
probation or bond conditions, or violations of Temporary Protective Orders (Banta-Green et al., 
2013; Darke & Zador, 1996; Davidson et al., 2003; Sherman et al., 2008; Tobin, Davey, & 
Latkin, 2005).    
Encouraging more frequent and timely reporting of overdose emergencies to trained 
personnel could turn the tide of overdose deaths in the United States.  Many states have enacted 
statutes that provide immunity to the reporter of an overdose emergency, the overdose victim, or 
both.  Often called “Good Samaritan Laws” or “Medical Amnesty Laws” (MALs), these statutes 
are meant to encourage calls for medical assistance during overdose emergencies with the overall 
goal of saving lives.   
“Good Samaritan Law” versus “Medical Amnesty Law” 
 
Throughout this dissertation, the term “Medical Amnesty Law” (MAL) is used 
universally to categorize statutes that grant full or partial immunity from criminal liability 
specifically following overdose events.  In contrast, the term “Good Samaritan law” (GSL) has 
traditionally described statutes that provide protection from civil liability based on negligence 
committed during good-faith attempts to assist during an emergency (Dov Waisman, 2013).   For 
clarity, therefore, this paper distinguishes statutes that provide protection from civil liability 
following an wide spectrum of accidents (“Good Samaritan laws”) from statutes that provide 
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immunity from criminal responsibility specifically following overdose events (“Medical 
Amnesty Laws”), irrespective of how a statute may be labeled. 
Summary of limitations in literature 
 
Two surveys support the notion that target populations are largely ignorant of the 
existence of MALs or their provisions.  One survey among Washington police officers and 
paramedics by Banta-Green and colleagues conducted in the Fall of 2011 found that few had 
knowledge of the state’s MAL, which had been passed in June of 2010 (Banta-Green et al., 
2013).  Although the majority of respondents had been present at an overdose during the prior 
year, only 16% of the officers and 7% of the paramedics surveyed were aware of the new law.  
Knowledge increased following an informational intervention. 
A second survey by Evans (Evans, Hadland, Clark, Green, & Marshall, 2016) among 
young adult users of non-prescription opioids found that fewer than half (45.5%) were aware of 
Rhode Island’s MAL.  Participants were recruited from January 2015 through February 2016 and 
were surveyed about, among other things, knowledge of the 2012 MAL.   Awareness of Rhode 
Island’s MAL was associated with older age (age range was 18 to 29), being white, a history of 
incarceration, a history of injection drug use, lifetime heroin use, witnessing or experiencing an 
overdose, having heard of naloxone, knowing where to obtain naloxone, and experience 
administering naloxone (all p < 0.05).  The final explanatory regression model found an 
independent association between awareness of Rhode Island’s MAL and lifetime injection drug 
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use, having heard of naloxone, and knowing where to obtain naloxone.  An informational 
intervention was recommended. 
Two studies have attempted to determine whether MALs have actually been effective in 
accomplishing the goal of reducing overdose deaths by encouraging calls for professional 
assistance.  Rees attempted to measure the effects of naloxone access laws (NALs) and “Good 
Samaritan Laws” on opioid-related deaths.  (Rees, Sabia, Argys, Latshaw, & Dave, 2017)  
Drawing upon mortality data obtained from the National Vital Statistics System multiple cause-
of-death mortality files for the period 1999 – 2014, those researchers found evidence that 
adoption of a NAL leads to a reduction in opioid-related deaths of 9 to 11 percent, but failed to 
find statistically significant effects of MALs at conventional levels.    
McClennan used 2000 – 2014 National Vital Statistics System data, 2002 – 2014 
National Survey on Drug Use and Health data, and primary datasets of the location and timing of 
NALs and “Good Samaritan Laws” nationwide and reported that states with a MAL had a 15% 
(p = 0.050) lower incidence of opioid-overdose mortality (McClellan et al., 2018).  However, use 
of this timeframe limits the amount of data available to follow any trend in mortality, since seven 
(7) states enacted a MAL in 2014, six (6) states enacted a MAL in 2013, and five (5) states 
enacted a MAL in 2012.  Only four (4) states would present 4 or more years of data following 
enactment of a MAL.   
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Statement of Purpose 
 
The three studies presented in this dissertation address different, but interconnected, 
facets of combating the current overdose crisis.  The first study surveys MALs nationwide in an 
effort to provide baseline data on what protections currently exist. This contributes to a growing 
knowledge of MALs by analyzing statutory features that bear on the applicability of MALs to a 
broad range of overdose scenarios and whether or not MALs are easily understood.  Further, this 
work reviews features that may make some MALs more effective than others in encouraging 
calls for professional assistance following overdose events.   Suggestions are made concerning 
the language most likely to encourage calls for professional assistance during overdose events. 
The second paper presented in this dissertation attempts to add to growing knowledge of 
the efficacy of MALs by comparing drug poisoning death data from the five year periods before 
and after enactment of a MAL in those nine (9) states with the longest history of MALs.  While 
Rees (2017) and McClellan (2018) studied the effects of MALs on opioid-overdose mortality, 
this dissertation presents a broader analysis by studying the effects of MALs on drug poisoning 
deaths generally.  
From 2010 to 2017, the percentage of opioid-related overdose deaths among drug 
poisoning deaths in Georgia increased from approximately 40% to nearly 65%.  Failing to 
address the increasing importance of the opioid class of drugs would omit an important piece in 
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drug poisoning deaths in Georgia.  The third study examines barriers that may make purchasing 
Narcan®, an intra-nasally administered form of naloxone, more difficult in Georgia.  An 
examination of price, availability, and pharmacy policies that may discourage the discrete 
purchase of Narcan® may illustrate barriers not addressed by legislation.  To date, no other such 
study has been conducted.  
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CHAPTER 2 – NATIONWIDE SURVEY OF MEDICAL 
AMNESTY LAWS 
 
Abstract 
 
TITLE: “State-by-State Examination of Overdose Medical Amnesty Laws.” 
INTRODUCTION:   Timely medical attention could decrease mortality following drug or 
alcohol overdose events, but overdose victims and witnesses alike often delay or fail to seek 
professional help because they fear police involvement.  Statutes that provide immunity from 
criminal action can have an important impact on the likelihood of seeking timely treatment.   
METHODS:   We systematically collected and reviewed Medical Amnesty Laws (commonly 
know as “Good Samaritan Laws”) that are designed to encourage bystanders and others to 
contact authorities for assistance during overdose emergencies.  Each law was coded to analyze: 
(1) who receives statutory protections and under what circumstances; (2) what factors may 
undercut the credibility of statutory protections for those who may already distrust authorities; 
and (3) whether statutory language is easily attainable and understandable.  
RESULTS: Forty-six states plus the District of Columbia have Medical Amnesty Laws 
(MALs), but provisions differ widely in their scope of protection.  Some laws may not meet 
legislative goals because they either lack protections against collateral consequences of reporting 
an overdose or allow broad prosecutorial discretion.  Most MALs refer to other statutes for 
definitions, making them harder to research, assimilate, and understand.   
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CONCLUSIONS: Some statutory provisions should be more effective than others in 
encouraging calls for professional assistance following overdose events.  Narrow immunity 
provisions with complex language may not be easily understood by the general population, 
making certain statutes less effective in reaching statutory goals.  Prosecuting attorneys and 
policymakers are wise to consider overarching policy goals and potentially unintended 
consequences when considering prosecution and future legislation. 
 
 
 
Background 
 
Over the past 20 years, the increased availability of controlled prescription drugs 
(“CPDs”) and inexpensive heroin has led to a dramatic increase in overdose deaths in the U.S.  
Since 2008, drug overdoses have killed more people each year in the U.S. than either motor 
vehicle crashes or the misuse of firearms (The U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency, 2015).   
Whether a lethal opioid overdose involves CPDs or street drugs, the time from initial 
injection or consumption to death may leave a one-to-three (1 – 3) hour window for an overdose 
witness to intervene and seek medical attention for the victim (Enteen et al., 2010).  Naloxone 
products such as Narcan®, the first therapeutic drug overdose reversal agent, are easy to 
administer and are commonly used by medical professionals to counteract the effects of heroin 
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and other opiates (Sporer & Kral, 2007).  Some states allow police officers, paramedics, and first 
responders to carry and administer naloxone to avoid the delay in treatment that would otherwise 
occur while transporting an overdose victim to a hospital.  While published research has 
demonstrated the effectiveness of this approach (Banta-Green et al., 2013), other studies show 
that emergency medical services (EMS) are activated in fewer than half of overdose events (Seal 
et al., 2003; Sporer, 1999; Warner-Smith et al., 2001).  The low rate of EMS activation occurs in 
part because witnesses to overdoses are often drug abusers themselves and fear legal 
consequences such as arrest and prosecution for drug offenses, violations of probation or bond 
conditions, or violations of temporary protective orders (Banta-Green et al., 2013; Darke & 
Zador, 1996; Davidson et al., 2003; Sherman et al., 2008; Tobin et al., 2005; Tracy et al., 2005).     
Encouraging more frequent and timely reporting of overdose emergencies to trained 
personnel is a legislative goal that could turn the tide of overdose deaths in the United States.  In 
West Virginia, for example, “The Legislature finds it is in the public interest to encourage 
citizens to intervene in drug and alcohol overdose situations by seeking potentially life-saving 
emergency medical assistance for others without fear of being subject to certain criminal 
penalties.” West Virginia 16-47-2 (b).  Nearly all states have enacted statutes that provide 
immunity to the reporter of an overdose emergency, the overdose victim, or both.  Often called 
“Medical Amnesty Laws”, “Medical Immunity Laws”, or “Good Samaritan Laws”, these statutes 
are meant to encourage calls for medical assistance during overdose emergencies with the overall 
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goal of saving lives. 
1
  To be an effective medical amnesty law, a statute must grant immunity in 
a broad range of overdose events, convince those affected that its statutory protections will be 
followed by law enforcement officials, and be readily understood by those seeking to understand 
its legislative provisions.   
Methodology 
 
This study identifies provisions in state statutes that are most likely to save lives by 
encouraging overdose victims and witnesses to seek professional help during overdose events 
involving any substance.  “Naloxone access” laws, which provide civil or criminal protections 
for those who administer naloxone (an “opioid antagonist”) to opioid overdose victims, are 
excluded as being too limited in scope to motivate behavior during a wide spectrum of overdose 
events.  Similarly, “mitigation only” statutes, which do not confer immunity at all but merely 
grant an ability to argue for leniency at a sentencing hearing, are not included because they are 
unlikely to encourage those who distrust authorities to take action.   
                                                          
1 In this paper, the term “Medical Amnesty Law” is used universally to categorize statutes 
that grant full or partial immunity from criminal liability specifically following overdose events.  
In contrast, the term “Good Samaritan” law has traditionally described statutes that provide 
protection from civil liability based on negligence committed during good-faith attempts to assist 
during an emergency. (Dov Waisman, 2013)  For clarity, therefore, this paper distinguishes 
statutes that provide protection from civil liability following an wide spectrum of accidents 
(“Good Samaritan” laws) from statutes that provide immunity from criminal responsibility 
specifically following overdose events (“Medical Amnesty” laws), irrespective of how a statute 
may be labeled.    
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Using standard legal research procedures, a research team reviewed statutes that provide 
immunity in overdose emergencies.  The legal research system Fastcase was used to search for 
statutes in all fifty states plus the District of Columbia and the U.S. Virgin Islands that grant 
immunity for any reason in overdose emergencies.
2
  Multiple searches generated lists of statutes 
for review.  These results were then cross-referenced with a publicly available resource located 
at https://www.networkforphl.org/_asset/qz5pvn/legal-interventions-to-reduce-overdose.pdf 
(Davis & Carr, 2015) to ascertain whether all potentially useful statutes had been collected.  The 
research team then determined whether the language of each statute provided immunity from 
criminal justice actions such as arrest or prosecution within the context of a drug or alcohol 
overdose.  This research includes all laws in effect as of January, 2019.   
Characteristics of each statute were then evaluated under the following criteria: 
1. Coverage - The strength of a medical amnesty law’s ability to encourage bystanders 
and/or victims of overdose to contact authorities hinges on its ability to provide 
protections in a broad range of overdose events.  (Table 1, Items 3 – 4) 
2. Credibility - An effective medical amnesty law must be convincing to those affected that 
statutory protections will be followed by law enforcement officials.  (Table 1, Items 5 - 
16) 
                                                          
2
 Fastcase is a popular online legal research system that provides free access to members of many Bar Associations 
nationwide, including the State Bars of Arizona, Arkansas, Washington D.C., Delaware, Federal Circuit Bar 
Association, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Maryland, Minnesota, Mississippi, 
Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, South 
Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wisconsin.  https://www.fastcase.com/bar-
associations/ accessed 12/26/18.    
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3. Accessibility - An effective medical amnesty law must be understandable and 
ascertainable by the intended readership.  (Table 1, Items 17 - 19)   
 
Results 
 
One potentially effective way to address overdose deaths is to remove disincentives for 
contacting authorities when overdose events occur.  MALs have been enacted by statute in the 
majority of states and generally seek to increase the number of requests for professional 
assistance during overdose emergencies by removing threats associated with the criminal justice 
system.  This study comprehensively describes aspects of medical amnesty laws most likely to 
accomplish the intended policy goals of saving lives by encouraging requests for professional 
assistance during overdose events. 
Forty-seven states (including the District of Columbia, hereinafter included as a “state”) 
have enacted statutes, or contain provisions in existing statutes, that provide some measure of 
immunity against criminal prosecution following drug or alcohol overdose events. Some states 
(Connecticut, Georgia, Illinois, Kentucky, Michigan, Nebraska, New Jersey, New York, and 
North Carolina) have more than one MAL that provides for immunity under different 
circumstances.  Indiana only has a “mitigation only” statute.   Kansas, Oklahoma, and Wyoming 
do not have MALs as defined in this work.  Composite overviews are presented in Table 2 and 
Table 3.  
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1. Coverage.  (See Table 2)  Medical amnesty laws across the U.S. do not provide 
immunity consistently for everyone associated with an overdose event.   
A primary concern involves exactly who receives immunity from criminal charges, such 
as the illegal possession of controlled substances or underage possession of alcohol, following an 
overdose event.  If immunity provisions cover only those who seek aid on behalf of an overdose 
victim, some may hesitate or fail to contact authorities out of concern that the overdose victim 
may later face criminal charges.  Conversely, if a statute provides immunity for the overdose 
victim only, bystanders may fear contacting authorities for their own sake.  What about a 
bystander who attempts first aid on the victim, or lends a cell phone to another who calls for 
assistance?  Clear statutory definitions and broader coverage of those who may assist during an 
overdose emergency will more likely encourage timely contact of authorities.  
Amid the current, widely reported opioid overdose crisis, alcohol and non-opioid drug 
overdoses seem all but forgotten.  Medical amnesty laws that provide immunity for a broad range 
of overdose scenarios are more likely to encourage timely contact of authorities than statutes that 
limit immunity to a narrower range.   
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Seeker of aid only 
This study identified seven statutes (from Alabama, Louisiana, New Jersey, New York, 
Texas, Virginia, and Wisconsin) that allow immunity for the seeker of aid only, providing no 
immunity for the overdose victim.  This lack of immunity for the victim may discourage 
overdose bystanders from contacting authorities, especially if the overdose victim is a friend or 
loved one.   
Other statutory language may also dissuade bystanders from contacting authorities.  In 
Iowa and Minnesota, the seeker of aid must be the first one to contact authorities to receive 
immunity.  In South Carolina, a caller for help must reasonably believe that he or she is the first 
one to call to receive immunity.  Provisions such as these are less likely to encourage those who 
witness an overdose to contact authorities than statutes with more permissive language.   
Seeker of aid and others 
While it may be clear that someone seeks medical assistance when they call 9-1-1 for 
emergency assistance or deliver an overdose victim to a hospital, some states clearly extend 
immunity to those who assist in other ways.  Kentucky, for example, provides immunity for 
those who “act in concert” with a caller during an overdose.  Hawaii defines "seeking medical 
assistance" as action that “includes but is not limited to reporting a drug or alcohol overdose to 
law enforcement, the 9-1-1 system, a poison control center, or a medical provider; assisting 
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someone so reporting; or providing care to someone who is experiencing a drug or alcohol 
overdose while awaiting the arrival of medical assistance.” §329-43.6 (a) (2).    
Including all who attempt to help during an emergency is important, as an individual who 
renders first aid to an overdose victim (while another calls 9-1-1) may help save the victim’s life.  
An individual who meets first responders at the curb and leads them to an overdose victim may 
save precious minutes that prove critical.  Contributing to a life-saving effort beyond placing a 9-
1-1 call should not be disregarded or ignored, as mightoccur in those states that do not clearly 
provide for immunity for all individuals who aid or assist in overdose emergencies.  Failing to 
grant immunity to all who provide meaningful assistance seems to undercut the often-stated 
legislative purpose of saving lives. 
Although opponents to more inclusive measures may argue that the drug-using 
population could flout the law by falsely claiming that they assisted in order to obtain immunity, 
provisions such as the “good faith” requirement contained in most statutes already address this 
concern (See Table 1, Item 16).   
The overdose victim 
Many states confer immunity on the overdose victim whether a third party calls on the 
victim’s behalf or whether the victim contacts authorities on his or her own.  Missouri’s medical 
amnesty law is exemplary: 
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A person who, in good faith, seeks or obtains medical assistance for someone who is 
experiencing a drug or alcohol overdose or other medical emergency or a person 
experiencing a drug or alcohol overdose or other medical emergency who seeks medical 
assistance for himself or herself or is the subject of a good faith request. MO Rev. Stat 
195.205 1.  2. 
However, other states are far less lenient on overdose victims.  Colorado, North Carolina, 
and Pennsylvania mandate that overdose victims qualify for immunity only if the caller for 
assistance qualifies.  Alaska, Arkansas, and Virginia extend immunity to overdose victims only if 
they seek medical assistance themselves. Maryland requires that the overdose victim reasonably 
communicates that a medical emergency is occurring in order to receive immunity.     
Requiring an overdose victim to participate in the request for assistance seems to ignore 
the most serious overdose scenario: when the overdose victim loses consciousness and is unable 
to ask for help.  For example, a person who loses consciousness will be unable to reasonably 
communicate that a medical emergency is occurring to receive immunity in Maryland, or meet 
Alaska’s requirement that he or she “was experiencing a drug overdose and sought medical 
assistance” Alaska 11.71.311 (a) (2), or meet the requirement in Arkansas that the victim “… in 
good faith seek[s] medical assistance for himself or herself.”  Arkansas 20-13-1704 (a) (2).    
A person may only qualify for immunity one time 
A few states limit the number of times a person qualifies for immunity under a medical 
amnesty law.  Under 34-20A-113, for example, South Dakota provides:  “Any person seeking 
medical assistance or who reports a person is in need of medical assistance shall only qualify 
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once for immunity under §§ 34-20A-109 to 34-20A-112, inclusive.”  Iowa also permits an 
individual to receive immunity only one time.  Tennessee only confers immunity for an overdose 
victim on his or her first overdose.  South Carolina seems to allow some discretion with the court 
concerning whether immunity may be permitted for seeking aid more than once:   
“If the person seeking medical assistance pursuant to this section previously has sought 
medical assistance for another person pursuant to this article, the court may consider the 
circumstances of the prior incidents and the related offenses to determine whether to 
grant the person immunity from prosecution.”  SC Code 44-53-1920 (C) 
 
What substance involved in overdose event qualifies 
States also vary in what type of overdose event is covered: some states provide immunity 
for alcohol-only overdoses, other states provide immunity for only drug overdoses, and still other 
states allow immunity for either drug or alcohol overdoses.  Twenty-two states have statutes that 
provide for immunity only when an overdose involves a controlled substance, or other drug, and 
completely exclude alcohol overdoses.  Texas and Maine permit immunity only in alcohol 
overdose cases, with no provisions for drug overdoses.  Twenty-three states specifically allow 
immunity for either drug or alcohol-related overdose events.  Many states define “drug” 
overdoses as those involving controlled substances, while a few include alcohol in the definition 
of a “drug”.  Illinois, Michigan, Minnesota, and Oregon have statutes that limit immunity to 
overdoses involving only certain drugs, such as methamphetamine or marijuana. The extent to 
which states fail to provide adequate definitions for “overdose” is further examined in Part 3.  
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Statutory language that imposes more restrictive provisions will apply to fewer overdose 
events and will be less likely to encourage bystanders and others to contact authorities during 
overdose events.  Statutes that are less encouraging are less likely to achieve the desired 
legislative goal of saving lives.  
2. Credibility.  (See Tables 2 and 3)  Medical amnesty laws across the U.S. do not provide 
consistent assurances that statutory protections will be followed.   
A MAL is unlikely to influence action during an overdose event unless those affected 
believe that immunities described will actually be granted by authorities.  A prosecuting 
attorney’s ability to exercise discretion or find exceptions to a statute that allow prosecution 
despite an initial appearance of immunity may undercut public trust. Such discretion may be 
used in a manner that systematically excludes certain members of the public from receiving the 
benefits of a MAL, such as addicts with a history of drug-related arrests. MALs were evaluated 
to determine whether they imposed certain requirements for an individual to qualify for 
immunity, whether immunity is disallowed in absence of good faith, whether the overdose event 
may be considered as a mitigating circumstance if full immunity is not granted, whether 
immunity requires evidence from the overdose event, and whether immunity may apply to 
crimes involving the distribution of drugs or alcohol.  
Similarly, an official’s ability to seek penalties outside of prosecution may foster enmity 
among those who already distrust authorities.  Because many drug users fear police involvement, 
these collateral consequences, or potentially unforeseen penalties, of reporting an overdose are 
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critical to consider.  Collateral consequences may include civil asset forfeiture, using evidence 
gathered during an overdose event to prosecute other crimes, levying sanctions or requiring drug 
testing for those already under court supervision, or prosecution for possession of drug 
paraphernalia.    
Civil asset forfeiture (See Table 2) 
Civil asset forfeiture proceedings vary from state to state, but generally allow authorities 
to gain legal possession and title to assets, property, money, and other items that are “fruits of a 
crime”.  In some instances, seizure of assets may exact the most immediate, painful cost on a 
suspect because such assets could otherwise be used to hire legal counsel, post bond, or pay bills. 
Only Hawaii, Maine, Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada, and Vermont provide some measure 
of protection from civil asset forfeiture proceedings within medical amnesty statutes.  Because 
government officials could potentially confiscate and gain ownership of property (including 
money) following overdose events in other states, public confidence in those medical amnesty 
laws may erode, especially among the drug-using population. Further, not allowing some 
protection from civil asset forfeiture proceedings may outright discourage more wealthy 
individuals from contacting authorities during overdose events. 
Probation/parole/pretrial release (See Table 2) 
Unless an amnesty statute provides special protections for those on probation, pretrial 
release, or parole, individuals in that position are less likely to contact authorities for assistance 
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during an overdose event. Probationers and parolees are important consider because they are 
often at greater risk of overdose than others.  Noble v. State, Case No. 2476 (Md. App., 2018).  
Twenty-one states limit the ability to drug test or otherwise sanction a person on probation, 
pretrial release, or parole following a drug overdose event.  The lack of protection in remaining 
states makes those under court supervision less likely to contact authorities. 
Those under court supervision may still have to defend their actions following an 
overdose event, even in states that provide some measure of protection under a medical amnesty 
law.  See Noble v. Maryland, Case No. 2476 (Md. App., 2018).  In North Carolina, a person on 
probation receives immunity for certain criminal charges, but still may be drug tested; the upshot 
of which may result in a revocation of probation and a jail sentence if such drug test is positive.  
Because those on probation, parole, or pretrial release are particularly vulnerable to law 
enforcement action, a lack of protections in this area will more likely provide a disincentive to 
contact authorities during drug overdose events. 
 
Drug paraphernalia (See Table 2) 
Thirty states provide immunity for charges pertaining to the possession or use of drug 
paraphernalia during an overdose event.  Remaining states either specifically allow prosecution 
or are silent on this issue, seemingly leaving drug paraphernalia charges available for 
prosecution.  Although drug paraphernalia charges are usually considered minor offenses, the 
 
 
31 
 
 
 
 
 
presence of such items can justify a police search of property, support the decision to arrest, or 
be used to lengthen a criminal sentence.  The extent to which individuals contact authorities for 
assistance during overdose events, and later face legal consequences that arise from that contact, 
however remote, may influence future requests for professional assistance.   
Limitations on protections – prosecutorial discretion (See Table 3) 
Some states allow prosecuting attorneys discretion in determining whether or not 
immunity applies in a given case.  While officials should be able to exercise reasonable 
discretion in pursuing criminal charges, the public should not believe that the process is too 
subjective.  A prosecuting attorney’s ability to exercise discretion or find exceptions in a given 
case that enable either prosecution or aggravation of punishment despite an initial appearance of 
immunity should be cautiously measured so as to not undercut public trust.  
Medical amnesty laws often allow subjectivity to enter prosecutorial decision making by 
specifying requirements that an individual must meet to qualify for immunity, by requiring that a 
person act in good faith, or by allowing the use of evidence gathered during an overdose event to 
prosecute other crimes.  Prosecutors may be more limited by medical amnesty laws that permit 
an overdose event to be considered as a mitigating circumstance if full immunity is not granted 
or that require that evidence of a crime originate from the overdose event.  Prosecutors may also 
be limited by medical amnesty laws that permit immunity for crimes involving the distribution of 
drugs or alcohol.    
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Specific requirements to receive immunity (See Table 3) 
More than half of the states with a medical amnesty law describe requirements that an 
individual must meet in order to receive immunity, such as providing a name, remaining with the 
overdose victim, or cooperating with officials.  Such requirements may allow prosecutorial 
discretion regarding who receives immunity.  For instance, someone who calls 9-1-1 to report an 
overdose but fails to provide his or her full name, or fails to “cooperate” with police by providing 
names of all attendees at a party may or may not be considered to have met statutory 
requirements.  California, for example, requires that a person “not obstruct” a law enforcement 
officer, which may be subjectively applied under the facts of a given case. 
These provisions help ensure that police and first responders receive complete 
information about an overdose event.  While legislators may trust police officers and prosecuting 
attorneys to make appropriate decisions in such matters, the drug-using population (and their 
friends) may not share the same enthusiasm.  Witnesses to overdose may be reluctant to provide 
a complete name, or wish to make a statement regarding drug use by the overdose victim or 
others.  Such hesitation to fully cooperate may be deemed a failure to meet the standards of a 
medical amnesty law.  Statutes with fewer requirements to receive immunity may garner more 
calls for authority in overdose emergencies than those with cumbersome requirements. 
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Requirement of good faith 
Oregon, Nebraska, Texas, and Wisconsin do not require that a person act in “good faith” 
in seeking assistance either for him or herself or a third party, or have a “reasonable belief” that a 
person needs medical assistance.  Medical amnesty laws in all other states contain these “good 
faith” and “reasonable belief” requirements, which have their own merit in preventing 
individuals from defrauding the criminal justice system.  However, these provisions also could 
provide prosecutors with the ability to negate well-intentioned actions in some cases by deeming 
an action to be “not in good faith” and pursuing criminal charges. 
Partial immunity where full immunity not granted (See Table 3) 
 Arizona, the District of Columbia, Hawaii, Iowa, Maryland, South Carolina, Tennessee, 
Vermont and West Virginia have statutes that  allow the accused to mitigate a sentence by 
arguing for partial immunity where the accused does not qualify for full immunity.  
Massachusetts, Minnesota, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Rhode Island, and South Dakota 
have similar provisions for drug offenses, but not alcohol-related offenses.  However, at a 
sentencing hearing where full immunity is not granted, argument for leniency on the behalf of 
the accused enables the prosecuting attorney to request harsher sentencing by pointing out 
aggravating factors.    
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Evidence obtained as result of overdose event (See Table 3) 
 As officials enter the scene of an overdose event they may observe incriminating 
evidence, and to the extent that they can then bring criminal charges, confidence in medical 
amnesty laws may decrease.  Most states provide that immunity provisions protect against 
prosecution where evidence is discovered as a result of the overdose event and the need for 
medical assistance.  However, such provisions generally allow police to secure evidence by other 
means, such as receiving consent from a property owner to conduct a thorough search for 
contraband or by obtaining a search warrant to conduct a search.  California, Delaware, Texas, 
West Virginia, and Wisconsin do not articulate that immunity applies only where evidence is 
obtained as a result of the overdose and the need for medical assistance. Nebraska and Louisiana 
require evidence from the overdose event for immunity in drug overdose cases, but not alcohol 
overdose cases.   
Requiring evidence from the overdose event for immunity means that criminal 
investigations that were undertaken prior to an overdose event could remain viable.  However, 
the boundaries of police investigations are often blurry, leaving prosecutors able to pursue 
charges in some situations despite well-meaning intentions of an overdose witness.   
Evidence gathered independently of overdose event 
All states with medical amnesty laws allow the use of evidence gathered independently 
from the overdose event to prosecute other crimes.  This means that officers who are alerted to 
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the scene of an overdose may conduct surveillance and make valid arrests based on crimes they 
later witness.  Likewise, officers who arrive at the scene of an overdose may obtain consent to 
search property such as a car, book bag, or residence, and may seek charges for contraband 
discovered.   
While some may be less likely to contact authorities during overdose events because of 
the possibility of being charged with other crimes, an appropriate balance should exist between 
promoting responsible behavior during overdose events and allowing police to enforce criminal 
laws.  Allowing evidence gathered independently from an overdose event enables criminal 
investigations that began before the overdose event to remain intact, and also permits law 
enforcement personnel to pursue other criminal charges unrelated to the overdose event itself.   
Application to distribution crimes (See Table 3) 
Most states grant immunity only for “simple” possession charges of illegal drugs or 
possession of alcohol by minors, as opposed to charges involving the distribution of alcohol or 
drugs.  Prosecutors may be allowed to bootstrap other evidence, such as the presence of cash, 
weighing scales, or text messages to support prosecution of drug or alcohol distribution charges, 
which would remove such charges from the purview of medical amnesty laws. 
While all entities that provide immunity for drug crimes include “simple” possession of 
certain amounts of a drug among covered offenses, Colorado, Delaware, Iowa, Maryland, 
Minnesota, Pennsylvania, and Tennessee additionally cover specified crimes related to the 
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distribution, exchange, or delivery of certain drugs.  The District of Columbia, Georgia, Hawaii, 
Kentucky, Missouri, Nebraska, and Vermont provide some form of immunity for crimes other 
than “simple” possession of alcohol by minors, such as purchasing, acquiring, or sharing alcohol 
with a minor.   Expanding amnesty beyond possession of small amounts of drugs may reach 
those segments of the drug using population who possess the most drugs, and therefore may be 
most at risk of overdose.  Conversely, those heavily involved in the drug or (illegal) alcohol 
distribution business should not be granted unbridled immunity.    
3. Accessibility.  (See Table 3)  Medical amnesty laws across the United States are not 
consistently drafted in a manner that is easily researched or understood by the public. 
To effectively encourage those present at overdose events to contact authorities, statutory 
language should be easy to research and understand.  This group of statutory characteristics 
concerns the ease with which each statute can be interpreted: whether a definition is provided for 
“overdose”, and whether references are made to other statutes for definitions or other purposes.   
A statute is unlikely to be effective unless its intended audience can understand its 
provisions.  Beyond having clear language, the provisions of an effective medical amnesty law 
should be researchable with a reasonable amount of effort.  The efficacy of each medical 
amnesty law was measured by whether a definition for “overdose” was provided and how many 
other statutes were referenced (See Table 1, Items 17 – 19). 
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Definition of “overdose” (See Table 3) 
Whether an event constitutes an “overdose” may be obvious in many cases, but unclear in 
others.  Consider a social event where a person is lethargic and unresponsive.  Others attempt to 
offer aid.  Believing this to be an overdose, well-meaning bystanders contact authorities, who 
arrive and begin treating the patient.  Police also arrive and notice alcohol or drugs present.  A 
medical examination determines that the person was not suffering an overdose at all, but rather, 
suffered from a medical condition that might appear to be an overdose.  Could those at the party 
be charged with crimes related to the illegal possession of drugs or, in the case of minors, the 
illegal possession of alcohol?  If so, reports of such treatment by authorities may discourage 
those who encounter lethargic individuals from contacting authorities.   
Certain medical conditions may carry symptoms that mimic intoxication or overdose.  A 
person’s true level of intoxication may also change.  Providing a definition of “overdose” is 
therefore important to avoid uncertainty.  Most states provide a definition for “overdose” or 
medical emergency, which can be helpful in determining whether a reported overdose event 
should qualify for immunity, and may thus save the expense of litigation.  For example, the 
Florida medical amnesty statute does not contain a definition of “overdose”, which became a 
litigated issue in a criminal case (Florida v. Silliman, Case Number 5D14-2895, Fla. App., 
2015). See also State v. Brooks, 210 So.3d 514 (La.App., 2016), in which the Court of Appeals 
of Louisiana reversed the trial court’s grant of the defendant’s motion to quash the bill of 
information.  In Brooks, officers responded to a scene regarding two males who were “using 
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drugs” or “passed out high on drugs”.  An officer located two males in a car who appeared to be 
unconscious.  After failing to get a response from the males, the officer opened the driver’s door 
and both males awoke.  The males complied with the officer’s commands, did not lose 
consciousness or “slobber” again, and refused medical assistance.  The relevant statute, La. R.S. 
14:403.10, lacks a definition of “overdose”.  The court reasoned that for the purposes of La. R.S. 
14:403.10 B (the relevant MAL ) an overdose “must be of a lethal, toxic, or poisonous amount 
that is capable of causing death or serious injury, rather than one which is merely dangerous, ‘too 
great a dose,’ or causing a lower level of consciousness.”  Otherwise, the court reasoned, “[A]ny 
amount of a [Controlled Dangerous Substance] [would] satisfy this prong of the test for 
immunity granted by La. R.S. 14:403.10 B.”  (210 So. at 520)  See also State v. Jago, 209 So.3d 
1078 (La. App., 2016) which involved the co-defendant. 
If the legislative goal is truly to save lives by encouraging more calls for professional 
assistance during overdose events, medical amnesty laws should include a definition of overdose 
to eliminate guesswork and interpretation by courts.  Better yet, medical amnesty laws could 
encompass definitions such as those found in Georgia and Mississippi, which contemplate a 
layperson’s subjective belief of whether a person is experiencing an overdose.    
In Georgia: 
"Drug overdose" means an acute condition, including, but not limited to, extreme 
physical illness, decreased level of consciousness, respiratory depression, coma, 
mania, or death, resulting from the consumption or use of a controlled substance 
or dangerous drug by the distressed individual in violation of this chapter or that a 
reasonable person would believe to be resulting from the consumption or use of a 
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controlled substance or dangerous drug by the distressed individual. O.C.G.A. § 
16-13-5(a) (1).   
 
Georgia’s alcohol-related medical amnesty law defines overdose as follows:  
"Alcohol related overdose" means an acute condition, including, but not limited 
to, extreme physical illness, decreased level of consciousness, respiratory 
depression, coma, mania, or death, resulting from the consumption or use of 
alcohol or that a layperson would reasonably believe to be resulting from the 
consumption or use of alcohol for which medical assistance is required. O.C.G.A. 
§ 3-3-23 (j) (1) (A). 
To encourage professional calls for assistance during overdose events, some leeway 
should exist that enables bystanders and overdose victims to contact authorities without having 
to accurately diagnose an overdose victim’s true medical condition.   
The presence or absence of a definition of overdose may serve another benefit relating to 
the credibility that authorities will acknowledge immunities named in medical amnesty laws.  
For instance, in both Silliman supra, and Brooks, supra, courts grappled with medical amnesty 
laws that lack a definition for overdose.  Both courts looked to other sources and denied 
immunity because intoxication levels failed to be sufficiently serious.  Leaving such matters to 
court interpretation is less certain and unclear than defining what constitutes an overdose for the 
purposes of a statute.  Further, providing a definition of “overdose” may assist public health 
officials distribute accurate information about medical amnesty laws to the public.   
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References to other statutes (See Table 3) 
When a statute refers to other statutes for definitions, the legal research process becomes 
more complicated and less likely to be completed comprehensively (Read, 1941).  Courts often 
interpret a law in an unexpected way, or declare it altogether invalid, when a statute refers to 
other statutes for definitions (Boyd, 2008).   
Nearly all medical amnesty laws refer to other statutes for definitions or other purposes.  
Only medical amnesty statutes from Arizona, Florida, Illinois, Rhode Island, and South Dakota, 
and one of two statutes from Kentucky make no such references to other laws.  Medical amnesty 
statutes from Alabama, Louisiana, New Hampshire, New Mexico, and Texas, and one each from 
Nebraska and North Carolina make only one reference to another statute for defining terms.  
Twenty-six states have at least one medical amnesty law that refers to four or more other statutes 
for defining characteristics or other information.  Delaware, the District of Columbia, Michigan, 
Missouri, Nevada, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and Virginia have medical amnesty 
laws that refer to seven or more statutes.   
While references to multiple statutes undoubtedly complicate legal research, failing to 
provide citations may complicate research even more.  For example, understanding one 
Connecticut statute (21a-279) may require the reader to look up what is a “controlled substance” 
in that state, without a citation to the relevant statute.  Illinois omits a citation for “Class 3 felony 
possession of methamphetamine” in one of its medical amnesty laws (720 ILCS 646/115), 
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leaving the reader to research what constitutes that offense. Such complexity decreases the 
likelihood that a reader will fully research or understand the provisions of a statute. 
Limitations and Future Research 
 
State legislatures may enact medical amnesty laws and appellate courts may interpret 
statutes in a manner unforeseen by the authors.  As of this writing, most states do not have a 
lengthy history with their respective medical amnesty laws.  This work should be viewed as a 
starting point and future research should seek the most effective language in prompting calls for 
professional assistance during overdose events.   
Conclusion 
 
Medical amnesty laws have been enacted in a majority of states and in the District of 
Columbia to encourage requests for professional assistance during overdose emergencies by 
alleviating the fear of criminal charges.  Laws vary drastically, and some statutes may be more 
effective than others in encouraging calls for professional assistance.   
This study defined major features of existing medical amnesty laws as a first step in 
determining what provisions are most effective.  By comparing the efficacy of different medical 
amnesty laws, policy makers can craft effective tools to fight the growing epidemic of drug and 
alcohol overdoses in the United States.  
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Appendix – Chapter 2 – Nationwide Survey of Medical Amnesty Laws 
 
Table 1 – Rating Instrumentation to Examine Medical Amnesty Statutes    
  
1. STATENAME: Name of State        
2. STATNUM: Statute number and Edition (year): 
Protections granted by each statute: who receives immunity, what type of overdose 
event applies, and whether an overdose event may be considered a mitigating 
factor during a sentencing hearing.  
3. PERSON:  Immunity provision for individual who:  (1) calls or requests aid only, (2) 
overdose victim only, (3) both caller for aid and overdose victim (4) caller for aid and 
also others who act in concert in requesting aid (5) caller for aid and others who act in 
concert with caller in requesting aid and also the overdose victim (6) 
unspecified/unclear 
4. SUBSTANCE: Immunity provision related to overdose of:  (1) drugs, (2) alcohol, (3) 
either drugs or alcohol,  (4) unspecified/unclear, (5) specific drug or combination 
5. MITIGATEDRG: Is the action of calling/seeking assistance specifically mentioned in 
the statute as a mitigating factor that may be used at sentencing for drug-related 
offenses even if complete immunity is not granted.  Mitigation must be specifically 
mentioned in the statute.  O=yes, 1=no 
6. MITIGATEALC: Is the action of calling/seeking assistance specifically mentioned in 
the statute as a mitigating factor that may be used at sentencing for alcohol-related 
offenses even if complete immunity is not granted.  Mitigation must be specifically 
mentioned in the statute.  O=yes, 1=no 
Limitations on protections granted by each statute – what collateral consequences 
may occur despite immunity provisions 
7. CIVIL:  Does the statute under review provide for immunity from civil forfeiture of 
property aside from contraband?  0=yes, 1=no 
8. USEEVIDENCE:  Can police use evidence gathered independently for prosecution of 
other crimes?  Yes – evidence gathered independently may be used. O=yes, 1=no, 
2=silent 
9. DRUGTESTPROB:   Does the statute limit the ability to drug test or otherwise sanction 
a person on probation, pretrial release, or parole? 0=yes, 1=no, 2=silent 
10. PARAPHERNALIA:  Does immunity apply to possession or use charges pertaining to 
drug paraphernalia? 0=yes, 1=no, 2=silent 
Limitations on protections granted by each statute – areas open for prosecutorial 
discretion 
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11. QUALIFY:   Does immunity require that evidence for the arrest/charge/prosecution be 
obtained as a result of the overdose and the need for medical assistance?  0=yes, 
1=no 
12. WHATOFFENSEDRG:   Pertaining to drug overdose events, does immunity apply to 
“simple” possession of certain amounts of a drug only? If no immunity for distribution 
of any amount, answer is “yes”. Coded as yes if an individual could be punished for a 
drug offense related to the event.  If a person could be prosecuted for certain 
amounts of drugs, PWID, trafficking, supplying, distributing, etc. then this is YES.   
0=yes, 1=no, 2=silent, 3=not applicable 
13. WHATOFFENSEALC:  Pertaining to alcohol overdose events, does immunity apply to 
the possession or use of alcohol only?  If no immunity for distribution of any amount, 
answer is “yes”.  Coded as yes if an individual could be punished for an alcohol 
offense related to the event.  If a person could be prosecuted for distributing, 
acquiring or providing alcohol, then this is YES.    0=yes, 1=no, 2=silent, 3= not 
applicable 
14. OTHEROFF: Is there a possibility for arrest/charge/prosecution/penalty for 
another offense (whether drug or alcohol related or not) arising out of the event, 
even if a person might receive some immunity?   O=yes, 1=no, 2=silent, 3=not 
applicable 
15. OTHERREQUIREMENTS:  Are specific requirements named in the statute to receive 
immunity?  Requirements such as: provide name, remain with victim or at the scene, 
cooperate with law enforcement or medical personnel, being the first to call or 
providing other relevant information would denote a YES.  O=yes, 1=no 
16. SAFEGUARD:  Is there any safeguard against the intent to defraud, such as requiring 
that a caller or OD victim act in good faith or reasonably believe that an overdose 
event is occurring? O=yes, 1=no 
Complexity of each statute – whether statutory language is attainable and 
understandable 
17. OVERDOSEDEF:  Is a definition provided for what constitutes an overdose or medical 
emergency? 0=yes, 1=no 
18. OTHERSTATUTES:  Does the statute under review refer to other statutes for 
definitions, drug limits, etc.? 0=yes, 1=no 
19. HOWMANYSTATS: How many other statutes are referred to by the statute under 
review, if any? 0=N/A, 1=1, 2=2, 3=3, 4=4 or more 
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Table 2 - Coverage and protections granted by each MAL statute 
 Collateral Consequences 
STATE MAL Citation Receiver of Immunity Overdose Substance  Immunity 
provision 
regarding 
paraphernalia 
charges? 
Immunity 
provision 
regarding 
civil asset 
forfeiture? 
Immunity 
provision 
regarding 
Probation 
or parole 
violation? 
Alabama 20-2-281 (2017) caller either drugs or alcohol no no no 
Alaska 11.71.311 (2017) caller and OD victim drugs no no no 
12.55.155 (d) (19) 
(2015)  
“Mitigation only” statute – not included in data calculations 
Arizona 13-3423 (2018) caller, OD victim drugs yes no no 
Arkansas 20-13-1701 et seq. 
(2018) 
caller, others, OD 
victim 
either drugs or alcohol no  no yes 
California Health/Safety 11376.5 
(2018) 
caller, OD victim drugs or drug in 
combination w/ 
alcohol 
yes no no 
Colorado 18-1-711 (2018) caller and OD victim either drugs or alcohol yes no no 
Connecticut 21a-267 (2017) caller and OD victim either drugs or alcohol yes no no 
21a-279 (2017) caller and OD victim either drugs or alcohol no  no no 
Delaware T. 16 S. 4769 (2018) caller, others, OD 
victim 
either drugs or alcohol yes no yes 
Dist. Columbia 7-403 (2018) caller and OD victim either drugs or alcohol yes  no yes 
Florida 893.21 (2018) caller and OD victim drugs no no no 
921.0026 (2016) “Mitigation only” statute – not included in data calculations 
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Georgia 3-3-23 (2018) caller, others, OD 
victim 
alcohol no no yes 
16-13-5 (2018) caller, others, OD 
victim 
drugs yes no yes 
Hawaii 329-43.6 (2017) caller, others, OD 
victim 
either drugs or alcohol yes yes yes 
Idaho 37-2739 C (2018) caller and OD victim drugs yes no no 
Illinois 720 ILCS 646/115 
(2018) 
caller and OD victim specific 
drug/combination  
no  no no 
720 ILCS 570/414 
(2018) 
caller and OD victim drugs no  no no 
730 ILCS 5/5-5-3.1 
(2016) 
“Mitigation only” statute – not included in data calculations 
Indiana IC 35-38-1-7.1 (2018) “Mitigation only” statute – not included in data calculations 
16-42-27.2 (2017) “Mitigation only” statute – not included in data calculations 
Iowa 124.418 (2018) caller and OD victim drugs yes no yes 
Kentucky 218A.133 (2018) caller, others, OD 
victim 
drugs yes no no 
244.992 (2018) caller, others, OD 
victim 
alcohol no  no no 
Louisiana 14:403.10 (2017) caller and OD victim drugs no  no no 
14:403.9 (2017) caller alcohol no no no 
Maine 28-A Section 2087 
(2018) ** 
caller and OD victim alcohol no  yes no 
28-A Section 2051 
(2018) *** 
caller and OD victim alcohol no yes no 
Maryland Crim Proc 1-210 (2018) caller, others, OD 
victim 
either drugs or alcohol yes no yes 
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Massachusetts Ch94C, Section 34A 
(2017) 
caller and OD victim drugs no no no 
Michigan 
 
333.7403 (2018) caller, others, OD 
victim 
specific 
drug/combination 
no no no 
333.7404 (2018) caller, others, OD 
victim 
specific 
drug/combination 
no no no 
Minnesota 604A.05 (2018) caller and OD victim drugs, specific 
drug/combination 
yes no yes 
Mississippi 41-29-149.1 (2018) caller, others, OD 
victim 
drugs yes yes yes 
Missouri 195.205 (2017) caller, others, OD 
victim 
either drugs or alcohol yes yes yes 
Montana 50-32-609 et seq. 
(2017) 
caller and OD victim drugs yes no yes 
Nebraska 53-180.05 (2018) caller and OD victim alcohol no  no no 
28-472 (2017) caller and OD victim drugs yes no no 
Nevada 453C.150 (2017) caller, others, OD 
victim 
either drugs or alcohol yes yes yes 
New 
Hampshire 
318-B: 28-b (2018) caller and OD victim drugs no  no no 
New Jersey 
 
2C:35-31-8 (2018) OD victim drugs yes no yes 
2C:35-30-7 (2018) caller drugs yes no yes 
New Mexico 30-31-27.1 (2018) caller and OD victim drugs no no no 
New York 
 
220.78 (2018) caller and OD victim either drugs or alcohol yes no no 
220.03 (2018) caller  either drugs or alcohol no  no no 
390.40 (2016) “Mitigation only” statute – not included in data calculations 
N. Carolina 
 
18B-302.2 (2017) caller and OD victim alcohol no  no yes 
90-96.2 (2017) caller and OD victim drugs yes no yes 
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*No provision as defined in this paper. 
**In Maine, the penalty is a civil forfeiture and the statute provides immunity for that penalty. 
*** In Maine, a minor who violates this statute commits a civil violation. 
N. Dakota 19-03.1-23.4 (2015) caller, others, OD 
victim 
drugs yes no no 
Ohio 2925.11 (2016) caller and OD victim drugs no  no no 
Oregon 475.898 (2017) caller and OD victim drugs yes no yes 
 475.B393 (2017) caller and OD victim specific drug – 
cannabis 
yes no yes 
Pennsylvania 35PA Stat. 780-113.7 
(2018) 
caller and OD victim drugs yes no yes 
Rhode Island 21-28.8-4 (2018) caller and OD victim either drugs or alcohol yes no yes 
South Carolina 44-53-1910 et seq. 
(2018) 
caller and OD victim either drugs or alcohol yes no no 
South Dakota 34-20A-109 et seq. 
(2018) 
caller and OD victim drugs no no no 
Tennessee 63-1-156 (2018) caller, others, OD 
victim 
drugs yes no yes 
Texas Alc. Bev. T. 4  106.04 
(2017) 
caller alcohol no  no no 
Utah 58-37-8-16 (2018) caller and OD victim either drugs or alcohol yes no no 
76-3-203.11 (2018) “Mitigation only” statute – not included in data calculations 
Vermont T.18, Sec.4254 (2018) caller and OD victim either drugs or alcohol no yes yes 
Virginia 18.2-251.03 (2018) caller either drugs or alcohol yes no no 
Washington 69.50.315 (2018) caller and OD victim drugs no  no no 
9.94A.535 (2018) “Mitigation only” statute – not included in data calculations 
West Virginia 16-47-1 et seq. (2017) caller and OD victim either drugs or alcohol no no yes 
Wisconsin 961.443 (2018) caller drugs yes no yes 
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Table 3 – Limitations on protections and complexity of each MAL  
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 Prosecutorial Discretion Accessibility  
STATE MAL Citation  Is mitigation 
possible if full 
amnesty is not 
granted? 
Immunity 
require 
evidence 
from OD 
event? 
Immunity for 
certain 
distribution 
crimes? 
Specific 
requirements 
to receive 
immunity? 
Overdose 
Definition 
Provided? 
Number of 
other statutes 
referenced 
Alabama 20-2-281 (2017) no provision yes no yes no 1 
Alaska 11.71.311 (2017) no provision yes no yes yes 4 
Arizona 13-3423 (2018) Yes yes no no no 0 
Arkansas 20-13-1701 et 
seq. (2018) 
no provision yes no no yes 3 
California Health/Safety 
11376.5 (2018) 
no provision no no yes yes 4 
Colorado 18-1-711 (2018) no provision yes drug only yes yes 6 
Connecticut 21a-267 (2017) no provision yes no no no 2 
21a-279 (2017) no provision yes no no no 2 
Delaware T. 16 S. 4769 
(2018) 
no provision no yes yes yes 7 
D. of Columbia 7-403 (2018) Yes yes alcohol only no yes 7 
Florida 893.21 (2018) no provision yes no no no 0 
Georgia 3-3-23 (2018) no provision yes alcohol only no yes 4 
16-13-5 (2018) no provision yes no yes yes 3 
Hawaii 329-43.6 (2017) Yes yes alcohol only no yes 3 
Idaho 37-2739 C (2018) no provision yes no no no 3 
Illinois 720 ILCS 
646/115 (2018) 
no provision yes no no yes 0 
720 ILCS 
570/414 (2018) 
no provision yes no no yes 0 
Iowa 124.418 (2018) Yes yes drug only yes yes 4 
Kentucky 218A.133 (2018) no provision yes no yes yes 0 
244.992 (2018) no provision yes alcohol only yes no 4 
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Louisiana 14:403.10 (2017) no provision yes no no no 1 
14:403.9  (2017) no provision no no yes no 1 
Maine 28-A Section 
2087 (2018)  
no provision yes no no yes 2 
28-A Section 
2051 (2018) 
no provision yes no no no 2 
Maryland Crim Proc 1-210 
(2018) 
Yes yes yes no no 6 
Massachusetts Ch94C, Section 
34A (2017) 
mitigation for 
drug, not 
alcohol 
offenses 
yes no no no 3 
Michigan 333.7403 (2018) no provision yes no no yes 8 
333.7404 (2018) no provision yes no no yes 8 
Minnesota 604A.05 (2018) mitigation for 
drug, not 
alcohol 
offenses 
yes drug only yes yes 4 
Mississippi 41-29-149.1 
(2018) 
no provision yes no no yes 4 
Missouri 195.205 (2017) no provision yes alcohol only no yes 8 
Montana 50-32-608 et 
seq. (2017) 
mitigation for 
drug, not 
alcohol 
offenses 
yes no no yes 4 
Nebraska 53-180.05 (2018) no provision no yes yes no 1 
28-472 (2018) no provision yes no yes yes 2 
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Nevada 453C.150 (2017) mitigation for 
drug, not 
alcohol 
offenses 
yes no no yes 9 
New 
Hampshire 
318-B: 28-b 
(2018) 
no provision yes no yes yes 1 
New Jersey 2C:35-31-8 
(2018) 
no provision yes no no no 6 
2C:35-30-7 
(2018) 
no provision yes no no no 6 
New Mexico 30-31-27.1 
(2018) 
mitigation for 
drug, not 
alcohol 
offenses 
yes no no no 1 
New York 220.78 (2018) no provision yes yes no yes 5 
220.03 (2018) no provision yes no no no 2 
N. Carolina 18B-302.2 (2017) no provision yes no yes no 1 
90-96.2 (2017) no provision yes no yes yes 2 
N. Dakota 19-03.1-23.4 
(2017) 
no provision yes no yes no 6 
Ohio 2925.11 (2016) no provision* yes no yes no 4 
Oregon 475.898 (2017) no provision yes no no yes 11 
475B.393 (2017) no provision yes yes no yes 3 
Pennsylvania 35PA Stat. 780-
113.7 (2018) 
no provision yes drug only yes yes 7 
Rhode Island 21-28.8-4 (2018) mitigation for 
drug, not 
yes no no no 0 
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*No provision for mitigation as defined in this paper. 
alcohol 
offenses 
South Carolina 44-53-1910 et 
seq. (2018) 
Yes yes yes yes yes 9 
South Dakota 34-20A-109 et 
seq. (2018) 
mitigation for 
drug, not 
alcohol 
offenses 
yes no yes yes 0 
Tennessee 63-1-156 (2018) Yes yes drug only no yes 4 
Texas Alc. Bev. T. 4  
106.04 (2017) 
no provision no no yes no 1 
Utah 58-37-8-16 
(2018) 
no provision yes no yes no 2 
Vermont T.18, Sec.4254 
(2018) 
Yes yes alcohol only yes yes 4 
Virginia 18.2-251.03 
(2018) 
no provision yes no yes yes 8 
Washington 69.50.315 (2018) no provision yes no no no 2 
West Virginia 16-47-1 et seq. 
(2017) 
Yes no no yes yes 6 
Wisconsin 961.443 (2018) no provision no no no no 3 
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CHAPTER 3 - COMPARISON OF DRUG POISONING DEATH RATES IN NINE 
STATES WITH A MEDICAL AMNESTY LAW  
 
Abstract 
 
Background:  Timely medical attention could decrease mortality during drug overdose events, 
but overdose victims and witnesses alike often delay or fail to seek professional help because 
they fear police involvement.  Statutes that provide immunity from criminal action can have an 
important impact on the likelihood of seeking timely treatment.   
Methods:  We examined those states with at least five years of data available before and after 
enactment of Medical Amnesty Laws (also known as Good Samaritan Laws) to determine 
whether such laws corresponded with decreased drug overdose death rates.   Sufficient data exist 
for nine states to allow the comparison.  
Results:  New Mexico was the first state to enact a Medical Amnesty Law (on June 15, 2007), 
and exhibited declining overdose death rates for some age groups during the period analyzed.  In 
Washington, overdose death rates decreased for most age groups following that state’s medical 
amnesty law becoming effective (on June 10, 2010).  In Connecticut, overdose deaths continued 
to rise for all age groups for the five year period following enactment of that state’s Medical 
Amnesty Law on October 1, 2011.  Similarly, New York’s overdose death rates significantly 
increased for the five year period following enactment of that state’s Medical Amnesty Law on 
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September 18, 2011. Five states enacted Medical Amnesty Laws in 2012: Colorado (May 29), 
Florida (October 1), Illinois (June 1), Massachusetts (August 2), and Rhode Island (June 18).   
Drug poisoning death rates increased for the five year period following 2012 for all five states. 
Conclusions:   Correlations between overdose deaths and Medical Amnesty Laws do not mean 
either the presence or absence of causative effects, but may be helpful as policy makers craft 
laws that address overdose deaths.  Recommendations are made concerning statutory language 
and educational interventions. 
 
Background 
 
Over the past 20 years, the increased availability of controlled prescription drugs (CPDs) 
and inexpensive heroin has led to a dramatic increase in overdose deaths in the United States.  
Since 2008, drug overdoses have killed more people each year in the United States than either 
motor vehicle crashes or the misuse of firearms.  (The U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency, 2015)  
Despite leading in many areas of medical technology, the United States has the highest drug-
related mortality rate in the world (Cochran et al., 2014).   
While street drugs posed the greatest risk of overdose for past generations, since 2002, 
CPD abuse has resulted in more deaths than cocaine and heroin combined.  However, increased 
law enforcement pressure on the diversion of CPDs from legitimate channels has prompted drug 
cartels to increase the supply of heroin and other illicit drugs to the American market (The U.S. 
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Drug Enforcement Agency, 2015).  Today, heroin is more readily available and drives more 
overdose deaths than in 2007 (The U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency, 2015).  
Heroin carries well-known risks, and overdoses occur frequently among its users.  
Research of illicit drug use conducted by Tracy and colleagues, found that approximately one-
half (50%) of respondents had a minimum of one non-fatal drug overdose event (Tracy et al., 
2005). Among intravenous drug users, those experiencing a non-fatal overdose have ranged 
between 50% and 70% (Warner-Smith et al., 2001).  Moreover, those who quit using heroin have 
a much higher likelihood of overdose if they renew usage, because tolerance levels usually 
diminish (The U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency, 2015).   
Whether a lethal opioid overdose involves CPDs or street drugs, the time from initial 
injection or consumption to death may leave a one-to-three (1 – 3) hour window for an overdose 
witness to intervene and seek medical attention for the victim (Enteen et al., 2010).  Naloxone 
(Narcan ®), the first therapeutic drug overdose reversal agent, is easy to administer and is 
commonly used by medical professionals to counteract the effects of heroin and other opiates 
(Sporer & Kral, 2007).  Some states allow police officers, paramedics, and first responders to 
carry and administer Naloxone to avoid the delay in treatment that would otherwise occur while 
transporting an overdose victim to a hospital.  While published research has demonstrated the 
effectiveness of this approach (Banta-Green et al., 2013), other studies show that emergency 
medical services (EMS) are activated in fewer than half of overdose events (Seal et al., 2003; 
Sporer, 1999; Warner-Smith et al., 2001).  The low rate of EMS activation occurs in part because 
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witnesses to overdose are often drug abusers themselves, and fear legal consequences such as 
arrest and prosecution for drug offenses, violations of probation or bond conditions, or violations 
of Temporary Protective Orders (Banta-Green et al., 2013; Darke & Zador, 1996; Davidson et 
al., 2003; Sherman et al., 2008; Tobin et al., 2005).    
Some states permit the dissemination of Naloxone to drug users’ family members, 
friends, and others who may be in the best position to respond directly to witnessed overdose 
events (Davis & Carr, 2015; Galea et al., 2006; Phillips, 2013; Seal et al., 2003; Sporer & Kral, 
2007).  While effective in many cases, this approach is not without potential problems.  Because 
Naloxone is generally safe and effective against opioid based overdoses, some may rely too 
much on its ameliorating effects and fail to seek professional help following an overdose.  
Further, Naloxone is only effective with opioid-based overdoses.  Overreliance on Naloxone or 
simply not knowing what drugs are taken by a victim could prove disastrous with a poly-drug 
overdose or when the overdose agent is not an opioid, because Naloxone does not ameliorate the 
effects of non-opioid drugs or alcohol.  Naloxone may also be perceived as a “safety net” which 
enables opioid drug users to take risks with dosage levels.  
Encouraging more frequent and timely reporting of overdose emergencies to trained 
personnel could turn the tide of overdose deaths in the United States.  Many states have enacted 
statutes that provide immunity to the reporter of an overdose emergency, the overdose victim, or 
both.  Often called “Good Samaritan Laws” or “Medical Amnesty Laws”, these statutes are 
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meant to encourage calls for medical assistance during overdose emergencies with the overall 
goal of saving lives.   
State legislatures may enact Medical Amnesty legislation because of an increase in drug 
poisoning deaths.  In other words, at the time such legislation is passed, a given state may 
already be in the throes of an increase in deaths brought about for a number of reasons.  
Legislators seek to enact legislation to address existing or anticipated problems.  One goal would 
be to study whether Medical Amnesty Laws (also known as “Good Samaritan Laws”) have had 
the intended effect of saving lives by encouraging victims and witnesses to overdose events to 
contact authorities for professional assistance.  However, a lack of direct data hinders 
accomplishing this research.  Because the motivation behind passing a MAL may be to address 
an existing problem, sufficient time must elapse because one can determine whether a MAL has 
carried its intended effect.  One problem is, however, that there is a lack of direct information 
concerning whether 9-1-1 calls for emergency assistance have increased based upon a particular 
state’s MAL.   
Further, a variety of factors could act as confounding variables that confuse the 
relationship between passage of a MAL and drug poisoning deaths.  Law enforcement pressure, a 
shortage or overage of either the illicit drug supply or diversion of legitimate pharmaceuticals, 
population changes, public service announcements and a plethora of other factors make direct 
measurement of the effect of a MAL on drug poisoning deaths bewildering.  Rather than seek a 
direct measure, therefore, the goal of this research is simply to determine whether drug poisoning 
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deaths have increased, decreased, or remained the same during the five-year period following 
enactment of a state’s MAL.  The election of a five-year period is to ensure examination of any 
existing trends, and to allow any effect of an MAL sufficient time to work.  No representation is 
made that the MAL would have a causative effect. 
 
Knowledge of MALs 
A study among Washington police officers and paramedics by Banta-Green (Banta-Green 
et al., 2013) in the Fall of 2011 found that few had knowledge of the state’s “Good Samaritan 
Law” (MAL), which had been passed in June of 2010.  Although the majority of respondents had 
been present at an overdose during the prior year, only 16% of the officers and 7% of the 
paramedics surveyed were aware of the new law.  Knowledge increased following an 
informational intervention. 
A survey by Evans (Evans et al., 2016) among young adult users of non-prescription 
opioids found that fewer than half (45.5%) were aware of Rhode Island’s “Good Samaritan Law” 
(MAL).   Participants were recruited from January 2015 through February 2016 and were 
surveyed about, among other things, knowledge of the 2012 GSL.  Awareness of Rhode Island’s 
MAL was associated with older age (age range was 18 to 29), being white, a history of 
incarceration, a history of injection drug use, lifetime heroin use, witnessing or experiencing an 
overdose, having heard of naloxone, knowing where to obtain naloxone, and experience 
administering naloxone (all p < 0.05).  The final explanatory regression model showed an  
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association between awareness of Rhode Island’s GSL and lifetime injection drug use, having 
heard of naloxone, and knowing where to obtain naloxone.  An informational intervention was 
recommended. 
 
Efficacy of MALs 
Little research has attempted to determine whether Medical Amnesty Laws have actually 
been effective in accomplishing the goal of reducing overdose deaths by encouraging calls for 
professional assistance.  Rees and others attempted to measure the effects of naloxone access and 
“Good Samaritan Laws” on opioid-related deaths.  (Rees et al., 2017)  Drawing upon mortality 
data obtained from the National Vital Statistics System multiple cause-of-death mortality files 
for the period 1999 – 2014, they found evidence that adoption of a NAL leads to a reduction in 
opioid-related deaths of 9 to 11 percent, but failed to find statistically significant effects of GSLs 
(MALs) at conventional levels.  In their fully specified model, Rees and others estimated a 
Poisson regression using the presence or absence of a NAL, GSL (MAL), State, Year, and a 
vector of controls that included the natural log of police officers per capital by state and year, an 
indicator for whether medical marijuana was legal, the natural log of the beer taxes by state and 
year, the natural log of the cigarette tax, and the natural log of the employment rate, natural log 
of the number of college graduates, the natural log of per capita income, and the natural log of 
the minimum wage.  The natural log of population and of police per capita, and the natural log of 
beer taxes were significant at the 5% level.  Other controls were not statistically significant.  
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Interestingly, Rees and others determined that the effect of a NAL improved 2 or more years 
after enactment.   
McClennan and others used 2000 – 2014 National Vital Statistics System data, 2002 – 
2014 National Survey on Drug Use and Health data, and primary datasets of the location and 
timing of NALs and MALs nationwide and reported that states with a MAL had a 15% (p = 
0.050) lower incidence of opioid-overdose mortality. (McClellan et al., 2018)  However, use of 
this time frame means that seven (7) states would present less than 1 year of data following 
enactment of a MAL in 2014.  Six (6) states would present less than 2 years of data following 
enactment of a MAL in 2013.  Five (5) states would present less than 3 years of data following 
enactment of a MAL in 2012.   Only four (4) states would present 3 or more years of data 
following enactment of a MAL (MAL enacted in 2011 or earlier).   
The project presented here presents a comparison of drug poisoning death data from the 
five year periods before and after nine (9) states with MALs enacted in 2012 or earlier.  
Including these nine states in the analysis allows for the controlling of numerous variables that 
could not be explained otherwise.  These states cover a broad section of the country, from East to 
West and North to South and encompass approximately 25% of the nation’s population.  This 
analysis includes two of the five most populous states (New York and Florida) and sparsely 
populated states (New Mexico and Rhode Island).  See Table 1. 
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Table 1: Population and rank of nine states 
State  National Rank by Population 
** 
Estimated Population 
(July 1, 2017)* 
Colorado   21
st
  5,607,154 
Connecticut  29
th
  3,588,184 
Florida   3
rd
  20,984,400 
Illinois  6
th
  12,802,023 
Massachusetts  15
th
  6,859,819 
New Mexico  36
th
  2,088,070 
New York   4
th
  19,849,399 
Rhode Island   44
th
  1,059,639 
Washington    13
th
  7,405,743 
Total  80,244,431 
United States   325,719,178 
*Source: U.S. Census Bureau - statistics accessed from https://www.census.gov 3/30/19.)   
** Source: Worldpopulationreview.com – accessed 3/30/19. 
 
Methodology 
 
All states with at least five (5) years of data available both before and after enactment of 
Medical Amnesty Laws (MALs) were examined.  The Centers for Disease Control (CDC) 
currently have published overdose death data available from 1999 through 2017.  Nine states 
(Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Massachusetts, New Mexico, New York, Rhode Island, 
and Washington) have sufficient data available for measurement of the five year periods before 
and after enactment of respective medical amnesty laws.  See Appendix, Exhibit 1. 
Data were downloaded from CDC’s WISQARS™ resource, (Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention, National Centers for Injury Prevention and Control, Web-based Injury Statistics 
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Query and Reporting System (WISQARS)) available at www.cdc.gov/injury/wisqars).  
WISQARS provides data concerning fatal and nonfatal injury, violent death, and cost of injury 
from a variety of sources, such as death certificate data reported to the National Center for 
Health Statistics (NCHS).   SAS 9.4 was used to compare drug poisoning death rates for the five 
(5) year periods before and after each state enacted its Medical Amnesty Law, using age-adjusted 
rates with 2000 as the reference year.  This study involves data available to the public and thus is 
exempt from Institutional Review Board approval. 
For each state, the age-adjusted death rates for the five year period before (“before 
period”) and after (“after period”) enactment of respective state Medical Amnesty Laws were 
obtained, tabulated, and compared.  The age-adjusted death rate for the year each state’s MAL 
was enacted was not included in any calculations. Next, unweighted averages of the before 
period were compared with the after period to determine whether data suggest an increase or 
decrease in drug poisoning deaths following enactment of each state’s MAL.  Because the before 
and after periods involve the population of each respective state over a period of several years, a 
paired-samples t-test is appropriate.  Assumptions for a valid t-test are: (1) the dependent 
variable (drug poisoning deaths) involves an interval or ratio scale; (2) the raw score populations 
are at least approximately normally distributed; and (3) the populations have homogeneous 
variance.   Further, two data points are available for each study year.  (Heiman, 2006)   As shown 
elsewhere, plotting the data demonstrates that the drug poisoning death data used in this study is 
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not normally distributed. Data are in the form of counts and so a Poisson distribution is an 
appropriate probability distribution to utilize.  
Results 
Nationwide results and comparison with the nine states with at least five years with a medical 
amnesty law are shown graphically in Exhibit 3.  As shown, drug poisoning deaths among the 20 
– 64 age range generally increased from 2000 – 2017.   
 
Non-fatal injury data 
 
Nationwide data from CDC WISQARS is also available for non-fatal injury poisoning deaths, 
but is not provided through the WISQARS program for individual states.  The definition 
provided by CDC for poisoning includes drug overdoses and also other categories of poisoning: 
 
Poisoning: Ingestion, inhalation, absorption through the skin, or injection of so much of 
a drug, toxin (biologic or non-biologic), or other chemical that a harmful effect results, 
such as drug overdoses. This category does not include harmful effects from normal 
therapeutic drugs (i.e., unexpected adverse effects to a drug administered correctly to 
treat a condition) or bacterial illnesses. 
 
As shown in the graph in the Appendix, nationwide non-fatal drug poisoning rates per 100,000 
have increased markedly for all age groups within the 20-64 age range from 2007 through 2017.  
See Appendix, Exhibit 4. 
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Results by state 
Colorado 
 
Colorado’s Medical Amnesty Law went into effect on May 29, 2012.  The measured age-
adjusted rates of drug poisoning deaths for the five year periods before (2007-2011) and after 
(2013-2017) the statute’s enactment date were as follows: before period (2007: 14.67; 2008: 
14.79; 2009: 14.94; 2010: 12.63; 2011: 16.04); and after period (2013: 15.54; 2014: 16.26; 2015: 
15.30; 2016: 16.51; 2017: 17.52).  The age-adjusted death rate for 2012, the year Colorado’s 
MAL was enacted (14.95) was not included in any calculations.  Comparing simple averages of 
the before period (14.61) with the after period (16.23) strongly suggests an increase in drug 
poisoning deaths despite enactment of Colorado’s MAL.  See Table 2. 
Table 2: Comparison of 5 year periods before and after enactment of medical amnesty law in 
Colorado 
Colorado Before 2012 – Drug Poisoning 
Deaths/100,000 
Colorado After 2012 – Drug Poisoning 
Deaths/100,000 
2007 14.67 2013 15.54 
2008 14.79 2014 16.26 
2009 14.94 2015 15.30 
2010 12.63 2016 16.51 
2011 16.04 2017 17.52 
Unweighted average of five years  
before 2012: 14.61 
 
Unweighted average of five years  
after 2012:  16.23 
 
One-tailed Paired t-test:  P= 0.028  
 
 
66 
 
 
 
 
 
Drug Poisoning Deaths and Rates per 100,000. All Races, Both Sexes, All Ages.  International 
Classification of Diseases, Tenth Revision (ICD-10) Codes: X40-X44, X60-X64, X85, Y10-Y14.  Source:  CDC 
WISQRS, available at https://webappa.cdc.gov, downloaded 3/19/19.  Age-adjusted Rate using 2000 as 
reference year, all races, both sexes, per 100,000 using the direct method.   
 
 
Connecticut 
 
Connecticut’s Medical Amnesty Law went into effect on October 1, 2011.  The measured 
age-adjusted rates of drug poisoning deaths for the five year periods before (2006-2010) and 
after (2012-2016) the statute’s enactment date were as follows: before period (2006: 11.47433; 
2007: 12.21314; 2008: 10.802; 2009: 10.98094; 2010: 9.999823); and after period (2012: 
12.10869; 2013: 15.97769; 2014: 17.56275; 2015: 22.0457; 2016: 27.32979).  The age-adjusted 
death rate for 2011, the year Connecticut’s MAL was enacted (11.19768) was not included in 
any calculations.  Comparing simple averages of the before period (11.09) with the after period 
(19.00492) strongly suggests an increase in drug poisoning deaths despite enactment of 
Connecticut’s MAL.  See Table 3. 
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Table 3: Comparison of 5 year periods before and after enactment of medical amnesty law in 
Connecticut 
Connecticut Before 2011 – Drug 
Poisoning Deaths/100,000 
Connecticut After 2011 – Drug Poisoning 
Deaths/100,000 
2006 11.47 2012 12.11 
2007 12.21 2013 15.97 
2008 10.80 2014 17.55 
2009 10.98 2015 22.03 
2010 10.00 2016 27.31 
Unweighted average of five years  
before 2011: 11.09 
 
Unweighted average of five years  
after 2011:  19.00 
*  Drug Poisoning Deaths and Rates per 100,000. All Races, Both Sexes, All Ages.  International 
Classification of Diseases, Tenth Revision (ICD-10) Codes: X40-X44, X60-X64, X85, Y10-Y14.  Source:  CDC 
WISQRS, available at https://webappa.cdc.gov, downloaded 3/13/18.  Age-adjusted Rate using 2000 as 
reference year, all races, both sexes, per 100,000 using the direct method.   
 
Levene’s test for equal variances was applied to compare the variances for the five year 
before and after periods. The result was statistically significant (p=0.0022). This supports the 
conclusion that the variance of the five-year before period significantly differed from the 
variance of the five-year after period.  Next, two independent samples t-tests were applied to 
compare means for the before period (2005 – 2010) and the after period (2012 – 2016). The 
unpooled t-test was statistically significant (p= 0.0192).  (Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention (CDC)., n.d.)  These measurements support the conclusion that adjusted drug 
poisoning death rates have increased despite the enactment of Connecticut’s MAL. 
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Next, the data were graphed to determine whether drug poisoning death rates may have 
decreased for certain age groups despite an overall increase.  Graphing the data shows that drug 
poisoning deaths continued to rise throughout the period studied for each of the following 
commonly studied age groups: 20-24 years, 25-29 years, 30-34 years, 35-39 years, 40-44 years, 
45-49 years, 50-54 years, and 55-59 years (See Appendix, Graph 1). 
 
Florida 
Florida’s Medical Amnesty Law went into effect on October 1, 2012.  The measured age-
adjusted rates of drug poisoning deaths for the five year periods before (2007-2011) and after 
(2013-2017) the statute’s enactment date were as follows: before period (2007: 15.40; 2008: 
16.18; 2009: 16.71; 2010: 16.38; 2011: 15.37); and after period (2013: 12.51; 2014: 13.16; 2015: 
16.20; 2016: 23.63; 2017: 25.04).  The age-adjusted death rate for 2012, the year Florida’s MAL 
was enacted (13.22) was not included in any calculations.  Comparing simple averages of the 
before period (16.00) with the after period (18.12) strongly suggests an increase in drug 
poisoning deaths despite enactment of Florida’s MAL.  See Table 4. 
Table 4: Comparison of 5 year periods before and after enactment of medical amnesty law in 
Florida 
Florida Before 2012 – Drug Poisoning 
Deaths/100,000 
Florida After 2012 – Drug Poisoning 
Deaths/100,000 
2007 15.40 2013 12.51 
2008 16.18 2014 13.16 
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2009 16.71 2015 16.20 
2010 16.38 2016 23.63 
2011 15.37 2017 25.04 
Unweighted average of five years  
before 2012: 16.00 
 
Unweighted average of five years  
after 2012:  18.12 
One-tailed Paired t-test p= 0.236  
*  Drug Poisoning Deaths and Rates per 100,000. All Races, Both Sexes, All Ages.  International 
Classification of Diseases, Tenth Revision (ICD-10) Codes: X40-X44, X60-X64, X85, Y10-Y14.  Source:  CDC 
WISQRS, available at https://webappa.cdc.gov, downloaded 3/19/19.  Age-adjusted Rate using 2000 as 
reference year, all races, both sexes, per 100,000 using the direct method.   
 
 
Illinois 
Illinois’ Medical Amnesty Law went into effect on June 1, 2012.  The measured age-
adjusted rates of drug poisoning deaths for the five year periods before (2007-2011) and after 
(2013-2017) the statute’s enactment date were as follows: before period (2007: 9.37; 2008: 
10.60; 2009: 10.79; 2010: 9.98; 2011: 10.92); and after period (2013: 12.03; 2014: 13.09; 2015: 
14.08; 2016: 18.81; 2017: 21.58).  The age-adjusted death rate for 2012, the year Illinois’s MAL 
was enacted (12.51) was not included in any calculations.  Comparing simple averages of the 
before period (10.33) with the after period (15.91) strongly suggests an increase in drug 
poisoning deaths despite enactment of Illinois’ MAL.  See Table 5. 
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Table 5: Comparison of 5 year periods before and after enactment of medical amnesty law in 
Illinois 
Illinois Before 2012 – Drug Poisoning 
Deaths/100,000 
Illinois After 2012 – Drug Poisoning 
Deaths/100,000 
2007 9.37 2013 12.03 
2008 10.60 2014 13.09 
2009 10.79 2015 14.08 
2010 9.98 2016 18.81 
2011 10.92 2017 21.58 
Unweighted average of five years  
before 2012: 10.33 
 
Unweighted average of five years  
after 2012:  15.91 
One-tailed Paired t-test p= 0.0156  
*  Drug Poisoning Deaths and Rates per 100,000. All Races, Both Sexes, All Ages.  International 
Classification of Diseases, Tenth Revision (ICD-10) Codes: X40-X44, X60-X64, X85, Y10-Y14.  Source:  CDC 
WISQRS, available at https://webappa.cdc.gov, downloaded 3/19/19.  Age-adjusted Rate using 2000 as 
reference year, all races, both sexes, per 100,000 using the direct method.   
 
Massachusetts 
Massachusetts’ Medical Amnesty Law went into effect on August 2, 2012.  The 
measured age-adjusted rates of drug poisoning deaths for the five year periods before (2007-
2011) and after (2013-2017) the statute’s enactment date were as follows: before period (2007: 
13.97; 2008: 11.91; 2009: 12.20; 2010: 11.03; 2011: 12.67); and after period (2013: 15.95; 2014: 
19.01; 2015: 25.66; 2016: 32.79; 2017: 31.65).  The age-adjusted death rate for 2012, the year 
Massachusetts’ MAL was enacted (12.71) was not included in any calculations.  Comparing 
simple averages of the before period (12.36) with the after period (25.01) strongly suggests an 
increase in drug poisoning deaths despite enactment of Massachusetts’ MAL.  See Table 6. 
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Table 6: Comparison of 5 year periods before and after enactment of medical amnesty law in 
Massachusetts 
Massachusetts Before 2012 – Drug 
Poisoning Deaths/100,000 
Massachusetts After 2012 – Drug Poisoning 
Deaths/100,000 
2007 13.97 2013 15.95 
2008 11.91 2014 19.01 
2009 12.20 2015 25.66 
2010 11.03 2016 32.79 
2011 12.67 2017 31.65 
Unweighted average of five years  
before 2012:  12.36 
One-tailed Paired t-test p= 0.013 
Unweighted average of five years  
after 2012:  25.01 
*  Drug Poisoning Deaths and Rates per 100,000. All Races, Both Sexes, All Ages.  International 
Classification of Diseases, Tenth Revision (ICD-10) Codes: X40-X44, X60-X64, X85, Y10-Y14.  Source:  CDC 
WISQRS, available at https://webappa.cdc.gov, downloaded 3/19/19.  Age-adjusted Rate using 2000 as 
reference year, all races, both sexes, per 100,000 using the direct method.   
 
New Mexico  
 
New Mexico was the first state to enact a Medical Amnesty Law, which went into effect 
on June 15, 2007.  Age-adjusted rates of drug poisoning deaths for the five year periods before 
(2002 - 2006) and after (2008 - 2012) the statute’s enactment date were measured as follows: 
before period (2002: 16.09855; 2003: 19.72859; 2004: 16.92997; 2005: 20.02567; 2006: 
21.73169); and after period (2008: 26.72703; 2009: 22.09201; 2010: 23.75318; 2011: 26.35467; 
2012: 24.79519).  The age-adjusted death rate for 2007, the year New Mexico’s MAL was 
enacted (23.39049) was not included in any calculations.  Comparing simple averages of the 
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before period (18.90289) with the after period (24.74442) strongly suggests an increase in drug 
poisoning deaths despite enactment of New Mexico’s MAL.  (See Table 7). 
Table 7: Comparison of 5 year periods before and after enactment of medical amnesty law in 
New Mexico 
New Mexico Before 2007 – Drug Poisoning 
Deaths/100,000 
New Mexico After 2007 – Drug Poisoning 
Deaths/100,000 
2002 16.10 2008 26.73 
2003 19.73 2009 22.09 
2004 16.93 2010 23.75 
2005 20.03 2011 26.35 
2006 21.73 2012 24.80 
Unweighted average of five years before 
2007:  18.90 
 
Unweighted average of five years after 2007:  
24.74 
 
*  Drug Poisoning Deaths and Rates per 100,000. All Races, Both Sexes, All Ages.  International 
Classification of Diseases, Tenth Revision (ICD-10) Codes: X40-X44, X60-X64, X85, Y10-Y14.  Source:  CDC 
WISQRS, available at https://webappa.cdc.gov, downloaded 3/13/18.  Age-adjusted Rate using 2000 as 
reference year, all races, both sexes, per 100,000 using the direct method.   
 
Next measured was the probability that the variances of the five year before and after 
periods were not significantly different.  An F-test comparison of the five-year before and after 
periods resulted in a probability of 0.707651, which supports the conclusion that the variance of 
the five-year before period is not significantly different from the variance of the five-year after 
period.  A T-test comparison of the before period (2002 – 2006) versus the after period (2008 – 
2012) using 1-tailed, 2-sample equal variance parameters resulted in a measurement of 0.00124.  
A T-test using 1-tailed, paired test parameters resulted in a measurement of 0.00847. (Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)., n.d.)  These measurements support the conclusion that 
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adjusted drug poisoning death rates have increased despite the enactment of New Mexico’s 
MAL. 
Next, the data were graphed to determine whether drug poisoning death rates may have 
decreased for certain age groups despite an overall increase.  Graphing the data depicts an 
unclear result for the 5 years before and after New Mexico’s medical amnesty law was enacted.  
While drug poisoning deaths per 100,000 may have declined for some age ranges, death rates 
may have increased for other age ranges.  However, data concerning female deaths for several 
years are missing, particularly for 2002, and also as follows:  35-39 year old females – 2007 data 
missing, 40-44 year old females - 2000 data missing, 45-49 year old females – 1999 and 2002 
data missing; 50-54 year old females – 2003 and 2005 data missing.   
An examination of the crude rate of deaths per age group indicates that drug poisoning 
deaths have continued to rise throughout the period studied for each of the following commonly 
studied age groups: 20-24 years, 25-29 years, 30-34 years, 35-39 years, 40-44 years, 45-49 years, 
50-54 years, and 55-59 years (See Appendix, Graph 2). 
 
New York 
New York’s Medical Amnesty Law went into effect on September 18, 2011. The age-
adjusted death rates for the five years before and the five years after 2011 were as follows: 
before period (2006: 8.583147 ; 2007: 8.652867; 2008: 8.517334; 2009: 7.969664; 2010: 
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7.778711); and after period (2012: 10.35329; 2013: 11.21153; 2014: 11.22377; 2015: 13.55951; 
2016: 17.86108).  The age-adjusted death rate for 2011, the year New York’s MAL was enacted 
(9.632934) was not included in any calculations.  Comparing simple averages of the before 
period (8.300345) with the after period (12.84184) strongly suggests an increase in drug 
poisoning deaths despite enactment of New York’s MAL.  (See Table 8). 
Table 8: Comparison of 5 year periods before and after enactment of New York MAL 
New York Before 2011 – 
Drug Poisoning Deaths/100,000 
New York After 2011 – 
Drug Poisoning Deaths/100,000 
2006 8.58 2012 10.35 
2007 8.65 2013 11.21 
2008 8.52 2014 11.22 
2009 7.97 2015 13.56 
2010 7.78 2016 17.86 
Unweighted average of 5 years before 2011:  8.30 
 
Unweighted average 5 years post-MAL: 12.84 
 
*  Drug Poisoning Deaths and Rates per 100,000. All Races, Both Sexes, All Ages.  International 
Classification of Diseases, Tenth Revision (ICD-10) Codes: X40-X44, X60-X64, X85, Y10-Y14.  Source:  CDC 
WISQRS, available at https://webappa.cdc.gov, downloaded 3/13/18.  Age-adjusted Rate using 2000 as 
reference year, all races, both sexes, per 100,000 using the direct method.   
 
The probability that the variances of the five year before and after periods were not 
significantly different was measured.  Levene’s test for equal variances was rejected (p=0.0142).   
Thus, a one-tailed independent samples t-test was found to be statistically significant (p=0.0206). 
(Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), n.d.)  These measurements support the 
conclusion that adjusted drug poisoning death rates have increased despite the enactment of New 
York’s MAL. Finally, the data were graphed to determine whether drug poisoning death rates 
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may have decreased for certain age groups despite an overall increase.  Graphing the data shows 
a clear increase for all age groups (20 – 59) from the 5 years before and after New York’s 
medical amnesty law was enacted.  (See Appendix, Figure 3). 
Rhode Island 
Rhode Island’s Medical Amnesty Law went into effect on June 18, 2012.  The measured 
age-adjusted rates of drug poisoning deaths for the five year periods before (2007-2011) and 
after (2013-2017) the statute’s enactment date were as follows: before period (2007: 12.39; 2008: 
17.32; 2009: 14.71; 2010: 15.68; 2011: 17.56); and after period (2013: 22.40; 2014: 23.51; 2015: 
28.19; 2016: 30.90; 2017: 31.20).  The age-adjusted death rate for 2012, the year Rhode Island’s 
MAL was enacted (18.11) was not included in any calculations.  Comparing simple averages of 
the before period (15.53) with the after period (27.24) strongly suggests an increase in drug 
poisoning deaths despite enactment of Rhode Island’s MAL.  See Table 9. 
Table 9: Comparison of 5 year periods before and after enactment of medical amnesty law in 
Rhode Island 
Rhode Island Before 2012 – Drug 
Poisoning Deaths/100,000 
Rhode Island After 2012 – Drug Poisoning 
Deaths/100,000 
2007 12.39 2013 22.40 
2008 17.32 2014 23.51 
2009 14.71 2015 28.19 
2010 15.68 2016 30.90 
2011 17.56 2017 31.20 
Unweighted average of five years  
before 2012: 15.53 
One-tailed paired t-test:  p= 0.00097 
Unweighted average of five years  
after 2012:  27.24 
*  Drug Poisoning Deaths and Rates per 100,000. All Races, Both Sexes, All Ages.  International 
Classification of Diseases, Tenth Revision (ICD-10) Codes: X40-X44, X60-X64, X85, Y10-Y14.  Source:  CDC 
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WISQRS, available at https://webappa.cdc.gov, downloaded 3/19/19.  Age-adjusted Rate using 2000 as 
reference year, all races, both sexes, per 100,000 using the direct method.   
 
 
Washington 
 
Washington’s Medical Amnesty Law went into effect on June 10, 2010.  Age-adjusted 
rates of drug poisoning deaths for the five year periods before (2005-2009) and after (2011-2015) 
the statute’s enactment date were measured.  The age-adjusted death rates for these years were as 
follows: before period (2005: 12.96102; 2006: 13.54069; 2007: 14.3514; 2008: 14.72573; 2009: 
14.34624); and after period (2011: 14.03146; 2012: 13.69048; 2013: 13.38226; 2014: 13.23332; 
2015: 14.72154).  The age-adjusted death rate for 2010, the year Washington’s MAL was 
enacted (13.11901) was not included in any calculations.  Comparing simple averages of the 
before period (13.98502) with the after period (13.81181) suggests that drug poisoning deaths 
did not increase following enactment of Washington’s MAL.  (See Table 10). 
Table 10: Comparison of 5 year periods before and after enactment of medical amnesty law in 
Washington 
Washington Before 2010 – Drug Poisoning 
Deaths/100,000 
Washington After 2010 – Drug Poisoning 
Deaths/100,000 
2005 12.96 2011 14.03 
2006 13.54 2012 13.69 
2007 14.35 2013 13.38 
2008 14.73 2014 13.23 
2009 14.35 2015 14.72 
Unweighted average of five years before 
2010:  13.98 
 
Unweighted average of five years after 2010:  
13.81 
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*  Drug Poisoning Deaths and Rates per 100,000. All Races, Both Sexes, All Ages.  International 
Classification of Diseases, Tenth Revision (ICD-10) Codes: X40-X44, X60-X64, X85, Y10-Y14.  Source:  CDC 
WISQRS, available at https://webappa.cdc.gov, downloaded 3/13/18.  Age-adjusted Rate using 2000 as 
reference year, all races, both sexes, per 100,000 using the direct method.   
 
Levene’s test was not statistically significant, so the pooled variance estimate was used. 
The independent samples t-test comparing the means for the before period (2005 – 2009) and the 
after period (2011 – 2015) was not statistically significant (p= 0.6884).  (Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention (CDC)., n.d.)  We failed to find a difference in poisoning death rates 
following enactment of Washington’s MAL. 
Next, the data were graphed to determine whether drug poisoning death rates may have 
decreased for certain age groups despite an overall increase.  Graphing the data shows that drug 
poisoning deaths rates among some age groups increased while rates among other age groups 
decreased from the 5 years before and after Washington’s medical amnesty law was enacted.  
(See Appendix, Figure 4). 
As shown in Table 11, Washington is the only state that did not exhibit an increase in 
drug poisoning deaths when comparing the five-year period before enactment of a MAL with the 
five-year period after enactment of a MAL.  Florida had a non-significant increase, but the 
remaining seven states had a statistically significant increase in drug poisoning deaths.   
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Table 11: Summary of 5 year periods before and after respective enactment of medical amnesty 
law in nine states 
State Unweighted 
average of five 
years before MAL 
Unweighted average 
of five years after 
MAL 
Difference 
in 5-year 
average 
deaths per 
100,000 
t-test values 
Colorado Unweighted average 
of five years  
before 2012: 14.61 
 
Unweighted average 
of five years  
after 2012:  16.23 
+1.62 One-tailed 
paired t-test: p= 
0.02816 
Connecticut Unweighted average 
of five years  
before 2011: 11.09 
 
Unweighted average 
of five years  
after 2011:  19.00 
+7.91 One-tailed, 
paired t-test: p= 
0.027 
Florida Unweighted average 
of five years  
before 2012: 16.00 
 
Unweighted average 
of five years  
after 2012:  18.12 
+2.12 One-tailed 
paired t-test: p= 
0.237 
Illinois Unweighted average 
of five years  
before 2012: 10.33 
 
Unweighted average 
of five years  
after 2012:  15.91 
+5.58 One-tailed 
paired t-test: p= 
0.0156 
Massachusetts Unweighted average 
of five years  
before 2012:  12.36 
 
Unweighted average 
of five years  
after 2012:  25.01 
+12.65 One-tailed 
paired t-test: p= 
0.013 
New Mexico Unweighted average 
of five years before 
2007:  18.90 
 
Unweighted average 
of five years after 
2007:  24.74 
 
+5.84 One-tailed, 
paired t-test p= 
0.00847 
New York Unweighted average 
of five years before 
2011:  8.30 
 
Unweighted average 
of five years after 
2011:  12.84 
 
+4.54 One-tailed, 
paired t- test: 
p=0.0206 
Rhode Island Unweighted average 
of five years  
before 2012: 15.53 
 
Unweighted average 
of five years  
after 2012:  27.24 
+11.71 One-tailed 
paired t-test:  p= 
0.00097 
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Washington Unweighted average 
of five years before 
2010:  13.98 
 
Unweighted average 
of five years after 
2010:  13.81 
-0.17 Two-tailed 
paired t-test: p= 
0.728 
 
 
Washington – examination by age group 
 Because Washington appears to be the only one of the nine states that did not increase in 
drug poisoning deaths, further analysis by age group was conducted.  
For the 20-24 year age group, change from the before period (2005 – 2009) to the after 
period (2011 – 2015) was not statistically significant (p= 0.674737).  
For the 25-29 year age group, change from the before period (2005 – 2009) to the after 
period (2011 – 2015) was not statistically significant (p= 0.274035). 
For the 30-34 year age group, change from the before period (2005 – 2009) to the after 
period (2011 – 2015) was not statistically significant (p=0.892222). 
For the 35-39 year age group, change from the before period (2005 – 2009) to the after 
period (2011 – 2015) was not statistically significant (p= 0.621263). 
For the 40-44 year age group, change from the before period (2005 – 2009) to the after 
period (2011 – 2015) was statistically significant (p=0.012275), suggesting a significant 
decrease in poisoning deaths within this age group.   
For the 45-49 year age group, change from the before period (2005 – 2009) to the after 
period (2011 – 2015) was not statistically significant (p= 0.098647).  
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For the 50-54 year age group, change from the before period (2005 – 2009) to the after 
period (2011 – 2015) was not statistically significant (p= 0.540306).  
For the 55-59 year age group, change from the before period (2005 – 2009) to the after 
period (2011 – 2015) was statistically significant (p= 0.010035), suggesting a significant 
increase in poisoning deaths within this age group.   
For the 60-64 year age group, change from the before period (2005 – 2009) to the after 
period (2011 – 2015) was statistically significant (p= 0.010035), suggesting a significant 
increase in poisoning deaths within this age group.   
 
Washington: Analysis by gender among age groups with significant change in drug 
poisoning deaths following enactment of MAL 
 
40-44 year age group among gender: decrease among males accounts for the difference 
 Because a significant decrease in drug poisoning deaths occurred in the 40-44 year age 
group, further examination was conducted by gender.  For the 40-44 year age group, among 
females, change comparing the before period (2005 – 2009) with the after period (2011 – 2015) 
was not statistically significant (p= 0.144291), suggesting no significant change in poisoning 
deaths among females in this age group.   
For the 40-44 year age group, among males, change from the before period (2005 – 2009) 
to the after period (2011 – 2015) was statistically significant (p= 0.001665), suggesting a 
significant decrease in poisoning deaths among males in this age group.  
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55-59 year age group by gender: increase among males accounts for the difference 
Because a significant increase in drug poisoning deaths occurred in the 55-59 year age 
group, further examination was conducted by gender. For the 55-59 year age group, among 
females, change from the before period (2005 – 2009) to the after period (2011 – 2015) was not 
statistically significant (p= 0.179089), suggesting no significant increase in poisoning deaths 
among females in this age group.  For the 55-59 year age group, among males, change from the 
before period (2005 – 2009) to the after period (2011 – 2015) was statistically significant (p= 
0.026662), suggesting a significant increase in poisoning deaths among males in this age group.   
60-64 year age group by gender: an increase in both males and females 
Because a significant decrease in drug poisoning deaths occurred in the 60-64 year age 
group, further examination was conducted by gender.  For the 60-64 year age group, among 
females, change from the before period (2005 – 2009) to the after period (2011 – 2015) was 
statistically significant (p= 0.014287), suggesting a significant increase in poisoning deaths 
among females in this age group.   
For the 60-64 year age group, among males, change from four years of the before period 
(2006 – 2009) with four years of the after period (2011 – 2014) was statistically significant (p= 
0.000545), suggesting a significant increase in poisoning deaths among males in this age group.  
Missing data for age groups 65 and older makes continuing this analysis difficult for these 
important age groups. 
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Regression Equation 
 
A regression model was fitted to explore associations between potential independent 
variables and the dependent variable of age-adjusted rates of drug poisoning deaths for the five 
year period before and after the enactment date of each respective state’s medical amnesty law.  
The null hypothesis is that drug poisoning deaths have not improved in the five-years following 
passage of MALs.  Data for all nine states were included in the model together to increase 
statistical power. 
This analysis is limited by design to the five-year time periods before and after each 
state’s respective MAL passage year.  The theory is that the influence of a MAL on a 
population’s behavior may require several years to take effect.  Some states had a large amount 
of missing data for certain age groups, especially among age-groups younger than 30 and older 
than 59.  Particularly, females were underrepresented disproportionately among some age groups 
in New Mexico.  See Appendix, Figure 1 (Connecticut), Figure 2 (New Mexico), and Figure 3 
(New York and Washington) for missing data breakdown by age-group and gender.  Rhode 
Island had missing data for numerous age groups among numerous years. 
Thus, regression analysis was run on age groups spanning 30 – 59 for all nine states to 
optimize available data.  Restricting the regression analysis to the 30 – 59 age range allows the 
model to include 100% of the necessary data for Colorado, Florida, Illinois, Massachusetts, New 
York, Washington, and 100% of the data for males in all years in Connecticut, and 100% of data 
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for 6 of 10 years for females in Connecticut.  For New Mexico, data for males was present in 9 
out of 10 years and for 7 out of 10 years for females.  Rhode Island was plagued with missing 
data, especially among females.  Data was missing for females in the 30-34 and 40-44 age 
groups for 8 out of 10 years, for the 35-39 age group for 9 out of 10 years, for the 55-59 age 
group in 5 out of 10 years, and for the 45-49 and 50-54 age groups for 2 out of 10 years.  Among 
males, data was missing for the 30-34 year age group for 4 out of 10 years, for the 35-39 year 
age group for 2 out of 10 years, and for the 55-59 year age group, for 1 out of 10 years.  See 
Appendix, Exhibit 5.   
The Poisson distribution is characterized by count data collected in a well-defined time 
interval which is the same for each individual.  (Hayat & Higgins, 2014)  Histograms of drug 
poisoning deaths among all nine states are displayed in Appendix Figures 4 and 5. 
Based upon available data, a generalized linear model with a Poisson distribution and log 
link function were fitted as follows: 
  0 1 1 2 2ln ... k kX X X        
 
ln (Deaths) = Bo + B1 (Sex) + B2 (Age Group) + B3 (State) + B4 (Year) + B5 (MAL) + B6 (Sex 
* Age Group) + B7(State * MAL) + B8 (Sex*MAL) + B9 Age_Group*MAL 
Offset:  ln (population) 
Variables are as follows:  
“Deaths” = drug poisoning deaths;  
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“Sex” = gender (males/females); 
“Age Group” = Age Groups (30-34, 35-39, 40-44, 45-49, 50-54, 55-59);  
“Year” = class variable (2002 – 2017) 
 “State” = Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Massachusetts, New Mexico, New 
York, Rhode Island, Washington; 
“MAL” = 0 (before period), 1 (after period);  
“Sex * Age Group” = interaction between Sex and Age Group; 
“State*MAL” = interaction between State and MAL;  
“Sex*MAL” = interaction between Sex and MAL; 
N = 1025. 
The null hypothesis is that there is no association between the passage of a medical 
amnesty law and drug poisoning deaths.   In other words, that drug poisoning deaths have not 
decreased but, rather, have either remained the same or increased in the five years following 
enactment of a MAL among those nine states. 
H0:  Drug poisoning deaths after 5 years >=  drug poisoning deaths before 5 years 
HA:  Drug poisoning deaths after 5 years < drug poisoning deaths before 5 years 
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The model explores the relationship between counts of age-adjusted deaths (dependent 
variable) and covariates, including Sex, Age Group, State, Year (as a class variable), MAL (5 
years before and 5 years after), and interaction terms between Sex and Age Group, State and 
MAL, Sex and MAL, and Age Group and MAL.  An offset on population was included in the 
model to treat population changes as a rate.   
The theory supporting the interaction between Sex and Age Group is that males and 
females probably have drug poisoning deaths that differ at different age ranges.  The theory 
supporting the interaction between State and MAL is that differences may exist between states 
and their respective MALs as they relate to drug poisoning deaths.  The theory supporting the 
interaction between Sex and MAL is that male and females within the same age-group may 
respond differently to the presence or absence of a MAL.    The theory supporting the interaction 
between Age Group and MAL is that people of different age groups may respond differently to 
the presence or absence of a MAL.  Calculations were preformed using SAS 9.4. 
 In assessing the goodness of fit of the model, the scaled deviance and scaled Pearson chi-
square statistics are considered.  Values closer to one (1) signify a better model.    Here, the 
scaled deviance value is 0.9850, indicating a good fit.  (Hayat & Higgins, 2014)   The lower-is-
best AIC value (9070.7235) is lower than all other models tested, further signifying a good fit to 
the data. Results displayed in Appendix, Figure 6. 
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   As shown by the summary statistics in the Appendix, Figure 7, all variables and 
interaction terms are significant predictors in the model.   Full results for the model are shown in 
the Appendix, Figure 8.   
 
Discussion 
 
 MALs are designed to help decrease, not increase, drug poisoning deaths by encouraging 
calls for professional assistance during overdose events.  Rather, this research suggests that 
MALs might have largely failed to carry the intended effect, or that other factors have 
overpowered any effect that MALs have carried.  Indeed, state legislatures may enact MALs 
because of growing drug poisoning deaths brought about by extraneous factors.  The positive 
association between a MAL and increasing drug poisoning deaths is likely an artifact of other 
factors that influence drug poisoning deaths.   
Effect moderation 
The following statistics are reproduced from the full results, shown in the Appendix, in 
Figure 8: 
Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Parameter Estimates 
 Estimate Standard 
Error 
95% Confidence 
Limits 
Wald Chi-
Square 
Pr>ChiSq 
Females -0.4903 0.0350 -0.5589 -0.4217 196.26 <.0001 
Males 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 . . 
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Sex*MAL (Females/0) 0.1003 0.0264 0.0486 0.1520 14.47 0.0001 
Sex*MAL (Females/1) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 . . 
Sex*MAL (Males/0) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 . . 
Sex*MAL (Males/1) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 . . 
 
 These results suggest that, generally, females have lower drug poisoning deaths than 
males.  The interaction between Sex and MAL, suggests that MALs may have a protective effect 
for females, but not for males.  Other comparisons from the full results in the Appendix, Figure 8 
seem evident: drug poisoning deaths vary among Age Group and also among States.  The trend 
of increasing drug poisoning deaths is reflected by different values of the variable Year.   The 
Sex by Age Group interaction demonstrates that females and males of different age groups carry 
different drug poisoning death rates.  Differences in interactions between State and MAL 
indicate a moderation effect, such that the presence of a MAL carries a different effect among 
the different states involved in this analysis.  Interactions between Age Group and MAL indicate 
that different age groups may respond differently to the presence or absence of a MAL. 
   
 Missing Data 
Rhode Island was particularly impacted by missing data.  Among females aged 30-34 and 
40-44, data were missing for 8 out of 10 of the relevant years (2007 – 2011, 2013 – 2017). 
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Among females aged 35-39, data were missing for 9 out of 10 years.  Among females aged 45-
49 and 50-54, data were missing 2 out of 10 years.  Among females aged 55-59, data were 
missing for 5 out of the relevant 10 years.  Male age ranges were remarkable more complete, 
with the following results:  30-34 (missing 4 out of 10 years, 35-39 (missing 2 out of 10 years), 
and 55-59 (missing 1 out of 10 years).  These results are shown in the Appendix, Exhibit 5. 
 
Washington is the only state of the four examined that has not had a significant increase, 
or non-significant decrease or a non-significant indication of no change in drug-related poisoning 
deaths within the 5 years following passage of a Medical Amnesty Law.  A closer look reveals 
that no significant change occurred between the two five-year spans for each of the following 
age groups: 20-24, 25-29, 30-34, 35-39, 45-49, and 50-54.  Missing data for age groups 65 and 
older hampers continuing this analysis for these important age groups. 
 
 
Comparison of MAL features among the nine states 
 
 Washington outperforms the other states concerning drug poisoning deaths.  Could this 
distinction be explained by differences in legal language among MALs in the nine states?  Is it 
possible that Washington’s MAL is different enough from MALs in the other states that 
overdose victims and witnesses are more likely to contact authorities during overdose events?  
Using the rubric described in the first paper in this dissertation, common features among MALs 
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in the four states are compared (See Appendix, Figures 9a and 9b, for Features of Medical 
Amnesty Laws from Nine States).   
 Essentially, no significant differences exist among the nine states in who receives 
immunity from prosecution under the respective Medical Amnesty Laws.  In Colorado, 
Connecticut, New York, and Rhode Island, both drug or alcohol overdoses are included in 
statutory provisions, while only drug overdoses are contemplated in Florida, Illinois, 
Massachusetts, New Mexico and Washington.  Colorado, Connecticut, New York, and Rhode 
Island allow for immunity concerning drug paraphernalia charges, and in none of the nine states 
will immunity provisions be granted for civil asset forfeiture proceedings.  In all states but Rhode 
Island, no immunity provision exists for those on court supervision, such as probation or parole.  
Thus, no state stands apart from the others in terms of legal protections on these characteristics, 
except for Rhode Island’s grant of immunity for those on court supervision.  This provision 
should tend to have more of an encouraging effect on witnesses to overdose to contact 
authorities.  See Appendix, Figure 9a.   
 No provisions exist to allow the use of evidence of overdose as mitigation at a sentencing 
hearing if full amnesty is not granted among the nine states, except for Massachusetts, New 
Mexico, and Rhode Island.  All nine states require evidence from the overdose event to exist for 
immunity to be provided.  None of the four states convey immunity for distribution crimes 
related to drugs or alcohol, except for Colorado (drug only) and New York.  Only Colorado 
imposes specific requirements to receive immunity, such as providing a name or other 
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identifying information to a police officer on scene.  Only Colorado, Illinois, and New York 
provide a definition of “overdose” within the statutory language of its Medical Amnesty Law.  
MALs from all nine states except Florida, Illinois, and Rhode Island make references to other 
statutes.  In short, no significant differences in statutory language among MALs from the nine 
states examined seem to provide adequate explanation for Washington’s lack of a significant 
increase in drug poisoning deaths.  See Appendix, Figure 9b. 
 Perhaps citizens of Washington are more aware of that state’s MAL, understand the 
parameters of legal protections against prosecution, and thus are more inclined to contact 
authorities during overdose events.  According to the University of Washington, Alcohol and 
Drug Abuse Institute, Washington held a press conference when their “Good Samaritan Law” 
took effect.  Thereafter, radio public service announcements included messages from the state’s 
Attorney General, the medical director of the Washington Poison Center, and the parent of a 
teen-ager who died of an opiate overdose.  References are made to the educational website 
http://stopoverdose.org, explaining the law.  Informational wallet cards have been distributed at 
needle exchange programs and at other venues, and posters have been displayed about the law at 
drug treatment programs.  Links to the website have also been included on other websites and on 
educational materials such as those distributed with opiate prescriptions.  Ongoing media reports 
of drug overdoses occasionally refer to the website.  Whether these efforts are significantly 
different from strategies in other states could be the subject of future study.  
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Limitations and Future Research 
 
Because correlation does not mean causation, the significance of MAL as a predictor of 
drug poisoning deaths in the regression model does not mean that medical amnesty laws have 
exerted an effect of increasing drug poisoning deaths.  In fact, drug poisoning rates might be 
higher within any given state but for the medical amnesty laws that exist.  Medical amnesty laws 
may have carried the intended effect of encouraging bystanders to contact authorities during 
overdose events.  Many other factors play a part in statistics related to drug poisoning deaths that 
the overall trends exhibited may simply outweigh any improvement effect on MALs.  Many 
potential variables likely affect drug poisoning deaths that could affect the results of this study or 
nullify the effect of a MAL.  This model is based upon drug poisoning deaths, while a more 
direct measure of a MALs efficacy may include comparing yearly calls to 9-1-1 emergency 
centers, or annual requests for assistance at hospital emergency departments.  Qualitative studies 
may help delineate the thought process of what occurs among those at or near the site of an 
overdose.  Further, the quantity of missing data available limits this study to the 30-59 age range.  
Possibly, younger or older age groups may respond differently to the presence or absence of 
MALs that the age groups studied here.   
 
Conclusion 
 
The association between the enactment of Medical Amnesty Laws and increasing or 
decreasing drug poisoning deaths does not mean that such laws either caused or prevented such 
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deaths.  More investigation is warranted to explain these differences.  This paper explored certain 
distinguishing features in MALs among these nine states and how the enactment of policies and 
informational campaigns in Washington may have led to greater success in combatting drug 
poisoning deaths.  Some limitations, however, may skew the data in favor of reporting overdose 
deaths in more populous jurisdictions.  (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, National 
Centers for Injury Prevention and Control.  (CDC). 2005)  Importantly, this research is consistent 
with other research that suggests that members of the population may be unaware of legislation 
designed to encourage calls for professional assistance during overdose events.   
 
 
 
 
Appendix – Chapter 3 – Comparison of Drug Poisoning Death Rates in Nine States with a 
Medical Amnesty Law 
 
Exhibit 1 - States with Medical Amnesty Laws enacted prior to 2012 
State Effective Date of MAL 
Source:  Rees, et al. 
Colorado May 29, 2012 
Connecticut October 1, 2011 
Florida October 1, 2012 
Illinois June 1, 2012 
Massachusetts August 2, 2012 
New Mexico June 15, 2017 
New York September 18, 2011 
Rhode Island June 18, 2012 
Washington June 10, 2010 
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Exhibit 2 - Drug Poisoning Rates for 2000 – 2017 for 9 states and the U.S. 
 Drug Poisoning 
Deaths 2000-2017 
Population Total 
for 2000-2017 
Crude Rate 
United States 637,886 3,272,940,342 19.49 
Colorado 11,598 54,950,592 21.11 
Connecticut 8,262 38,031,828 21.72 
Florida 45,841 194,403,714 23.58 
Illinois 24,044 137,012,529 17.55 
Massachusetts 17,724 71,972,414 24.63 
New Mexico 7,185 20,864,629 34.44 
New York 30,470 211,904,756 14.38 
Rhode Island 3,184 11,463,902 27.77 
Washington 14,893 72,583,457 20.52 
    
Source:  CDC – WISQARS, downloaded 3/2/19 
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Exhibit 3 - Comparison of Drug Poisoning Deaths for U.S. and Nine States for Age Ranges 20-
64, and Years 2000 - 2017 
 
Source:  CDC WISQARS, downloaded 3/2/19.  All Intents, drug poisoning, 2007-2017, no metro indicator, 
all races, both sexes, age groups 30-59, standard year: 2000.   
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Exhibit 4 - Nationwide Non-fatal Drug Poisoning Rates per 100,000 – 2007 to 2017 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
96 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Exhibit 5 – Missing Data for States Examined 
 
CONNECTICUT 
MAL year:  2011 
Years examined: 2006-2010/2012-2016 
 
 
Connecticut 
Gender/Age groups with missing data by year 
Percentage of total population missing for 
indicated year for ages 30-59 
Females  30-34 2006, 2009, 
2010 
2006:  105,250/780,869 = 0.135 
2009:  103,752/772,284 = 0.134 
2010:  104,194/770,777 = 0.135 
Females 35-39 2006 2006:  129,584/780,869 = 0.166 
Females 55-59 2006, 2007 2006:  117,843/780,869 =0.151 
2007:  115,579/774,753 = 0.149 
 
 
 
NEW MEXICO 
MAL year:  2007 
Years examined: 2002-2006/2008-2012 
 
 
New Mexico 
Gender/Age groups with missing data by year 
Percentage of total population missing for 
indicated year for ages 30-59 
Females 30-34 2002 2002:  59,123/381,770 = 0.155 
Females 35-39 2007 2007:  62,626/402,612 = 0.156 
Females 45-49 2002 2002:  70,018/381,770 = 0.183 
Females 50-54 2002 2002:  63,464/381,770 = 0.166 
Males 55-59 2002 2002:  47,949/367,805 = 0.130 
Females 55-59 2002, 2003, 
2005 
2002:  50,849/381,770 = 0.133 
2003:  53,746/384,992 = 0.139 
2005:  60,828/394,094 = 0.154 
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RHODE ISLAND 
MAL year:  2012 
Years examined: 2007-2011/2013-2017 
 
 
Rhode Island 
Gender/Age groups with missing data by year 
Percentage of total population missing for 
indicated year for ages 30-59 
Females  30-34 2007, 2008, 
2009, 2010, 
2013, 2014, 
2015, 2016 
MISSING 8 OUT OF 10 YEARS 
Females 35-39 2007, 2008, 
2009, 2010, 
2011, 2013, 
2014, 2015, 
2016 
MISSING 9 OUT OF 10 YEARS 
Females 40-44 2007, 2009, 
2010, 2011, 
2013, 2014, 
2015, 2016 
MISSING 8 OUT OF 10 YEARS 
Females 45-49 2007, 2015 MISSING 2 OUT OF 10 YEARS 
Females 50-54 2007, 2014 MISSING 2 OUT OF 10 YEARS 
Females 55-59 2007, 2008, 
2009, 2010, 
2011 
MISSING 5 OUT OF 10 YEARS 
Males 30-34 2007, 2009, 
2010, 2011 
MISSING 4 OUT OF 10 YEARS 
Males 35-39 2009, 2011 MISSING 2 OUT OF 10 YEARS 
Males 55-59 2007 MISSING 1 OUT OF 10 YEARS 
 
 
 
NEW YORK 
MAL year:  2011 
Years examined: 2006-2010/2012-2016 
 
NO DATA MISSING FOR THESE YEARS AND 30-59 AGE GROUPS FOR MALES 
AND FEMALES 
 
 
 
 
 
98 
 
 
 
 
 
WASHINGTON 
MAL year:  2010 
Years examined: 2005-2009/2011-2015 
 
NO DATA MISSING FOR THESE YEARS AND 30-59 AGE GROUPS FOR MALES 
AND FEMALES 
 
COLORADO, FLORIDA, ILLINOIS, MASSACHUSETTS 
MAL year:  2012 
Years examined: 2007-2011/2013-2017 
 
NO DATA MISSING FOR THESE YEARS AND 30-59 AGE GROUPS FOR MALES 
AND FEMALES 
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Graph 1 - Colorado 
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Graph 2 – Connecticut 
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Graph 3 – Florida 
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Graph 4 – Illinois 
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Graph 5 – Massachusetts 
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Graph 6 – New Mexico 
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Graph 7 – New York 
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Graph 8 – Rhode Island 
 
Note missing data limitation 
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Graph 9 – Washington 
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Figure 1 - Available data for 30 – 59 age group in Connecticut 
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Figure 2 - Available data for 30 – 59 age group in New Mexico  
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Figure 3 - Available data for 30 – 59 age group in New York and Washington  
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Figure 4 – Distribution of Drug Poisoning Deaths for Nine states show a Poisson distribution 
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Figure 5 – Probability Plot of Drug Poisoning Deaths for Nine states show a Poisson Distribution 
 
Figure 6 - Criteria for Assessing Goodness of Fit 
Criteria For Assessing Goodness Of Fit 
Criterion DF Value Value/DF 
Deviance 975 2950.3141 3.0260 
Scaled Deviance 975 960.3615 0.9850 
Pearson Chi-Square 975 2995.2848 3.0721 
Scaled Pearson X2 975 975.0000 1.0000 
Log Likelihood   95626.7778   
Full Log Likelihood   -4485.3618   
AIC (smaller is better)   9070.7235   
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Criteria For Assessing Goodness Of Fit 
Criterion DF Value Value/DF 
AICC (smaller is better)   9075.9597   
BIC (smaller is better)   9317.3459   
 
 
Figure 7 - Summary Statistics for Model 
LR Statistics For Type 3 Analysis 
Source Num DF Den DF F Value Pr > F Chi-Square Pr > ChiSq 
Sex 1 990 1307.72 <.0001 1307.72 <.0001 
Age_Group 5 990 27.83 <.0001 139.16 <.0001 
State 8 990 92.18 <.0001 737.42 <.0001 
MAL 1 990 193.04 <.0001 193.04 <.0001 
State*MAL 8 990 21.63 <.0001 173.03 <.0001 
Sex*MAL 1 990 8.47 0.0037 8.47 0.0036 
Age_Group*MAL 5 990 14.43 <.0001 72.16 <.0001 
Sex*Age_Group 5 990 18.24 <.0001 91.19 <.0001 
 
 
Figure 8 – Full Statistics for Model 
Analysis Of Maximum Likelihood Parameter Estimates 
Parameter   DF Estimate Standard 
Error 
Wald 95% 
Confidence 
Limits 
Wald 
Chi-
Square 
Pr > ChiSq 
Intercept     1 -7.6845 0.0471 -7.7768 -7.5922 26614.1 <.0001 
Sex Females   1 -0.4903 0.0350 -0.5589 -0.4217 196.26 <.0001 
Sex Males   0 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 . . 
Age_Group 30-34 yrs   1 0.2904 0.0327 0.2262 0.3545 78.75 <.0001 
Age_Group 35-39 yrs   1 0.2315 0.0335 0.1659 0.2972 47.75 <.0001 
Age_Group 40-44 yrs   1 0.1223 0.0340 0.0556 0.1890 12.92 0.0003 
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Analysis Of Maximum Likelihood Parameter Estimates 
Parameter   DF Estimate Standard 
Error 
Wald 95% 
Confidence 
Limits 
Wald 
Chi-
Square 
Pr > ChiSq 
Age_Group 45-49 yrs   1 0.1661 0.0331 0.1013 0.2309 25.25 <.0001 
Age_Group 50-54 yrs   1 0.1345 0.0330 0.0698 0.1992 16.62 <.0001 
Age_Group 55-59 yrs   0 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 . . 
State Colorado   1 -0.1306 0.0467 -0.2221 -0.0391 7.82 0.0052 
State Conn   1 0.1804 0.0483 0.0859 0.2750 13.98 0.0002 
State Florida   1 0.0395 0.0378 -0.0345 0.1135 1.09 0.2956 
State Illinois   1 -0.1060 0.0401 -0.1845 -0.0274 7.00 0.0082 
State Massachusetts   1 0.3416 0.0412 0.2609 0.4223 68.87 <.0001 
State Nmex   1 0.6222 0.0656 0.4935 0.7508 89.88 <.0001 
State Nyork   1 -0.2217 0.0375 -0.2951 -0.1483 35.04 <.0001 
State Rhode Island   1 0.5463 0.0660 0.4170 0.6757 68.52 <.0001 
State Wash   0 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 . . 
Year 2002   1 -0.5749 0.1720 -0.9120 -0.2378 11.17 0.0008 
Year 2003   1 -0.6331 0.1534 -0.9337 -0.3326 17.05 <.0001 
Year 2004   1 -0.7527 0.1559 -1.0582 -0.4472 23.31 <.0001 
Year 2005   1 -0.5690 0.0986 -0.7623 -0.3757 33.30 <.0001 
Year 2006   1 -0.5174 0.0821 -0.6783 -0.3565 39.73 <.0001 
Year 2007   1 -0.5416 0.0740 -0.6866 -0.3966 53.61 <.0001 
Year 2008   1 -0.5293 0.0732 -0.6727 -0.3859 52.33 <.0001 
Year 2009   1 -0.5324 0.0732 -0.6759 -0.3890 52.92 <.0001 
Year 2010   1 -0.5943 0.0736 -0.7385 -0.4501 65.24 <.0001 
Year 2011   1 -0.5043 0.0678 -0.6371 -0.3714 55.35 <.0001 
Year 2012   1 -0.5940 0.0442 -0.6807 -0.5073 180.27 <.0001 
Year 2013   1 -0.5562 0.0296 -0.6142 -0.4982 353.44 <.0001 
Year 2014   1 -0.5084 0.0292 -0.5657 -0.4511 302.38 <.0001 
Year 2015   1 -0.3504 0.0282 -0.4056 -0.2952 154.86 <.0001 
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Analysis Of Maximum Likelihood Parameter Estimates 
Parameter   DF Estimate Standard 
Error 
Wald 95% 
Confidence 
Limits 
Wald 
Chi-
Square 
Pr > ChiSq 
Year 2016   1 -0.0693 0.0268 -0.1218 -0.0168 6.69 0.0097 
Year 2017   0 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 . . 
MAL 0   1 -0.0950 0.0784 -0.2488 0.0587 1.47 0.2256 
MAL 1   0 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 . . 
Sex*Age_Group Females 30-
34 
yrs 
1 -0.4548 0.0484 -0.5498 -0.3599 88.15 <.0001 
Sex*Age_Group Females 35-
39 
yrs 
1 -0.3007 0.0478 -0.3944 -0.2071 39.61 <.0001 
Sex*Age_Group Females 40-
44 
yrs 
1 -0.1831 0.0465 -0.2743 -0.0919 15.48 <.0001 
Sex*Age_Group Females 45-
49 
yrs 
1 -0.0637 0.0445 -0.1508 0.0235 2.05 0.1521 
Sex*Age_Group Females 50-
54 
yrs 
1 -0.0064 0.0446 -0.0938 0.0811 0.02 0.8864 
Sex*Age_Group Females 55-
59 
yrs 
0 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 . . 
Sex*Age_Group Males 30-
34 
yrs 
0 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 . . 
Sex*Age_Group Males 35-
39 
yrs 
0 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 . . 
Sex*Age_Group Males 40-
44 
yrs 
0 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 . . 
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Analysis Of Maximum Likelihood Parameter Estimates 
Parameter   DF Estimate Standard 
Error 
Wald 95% 
Confidence 
Limits 
Wald 
Chi-
Square 
Pr > ChiSq 
Sex*Age_Group Males 45-
49 
yrs 
0 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 . . 
Sex*Age_Group Males 50-
54 
yrs 
0 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 . . 
Sex*Age_Group Males 55-
59 
yrs 
0 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 . . 
State*MAL Colorado 0 1 0.1100 0.0675 -0.0222 0.2422 2.66 0.1031 
State*MAL Colorado 1 0 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 . . 
State*MAL Conn 0 1 -0.4786 0.0749 -0.6253 -0.3318 40.84 <.0001 
State*MAL Conn 1 0 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 . . 
State*MAL Florida 0 1 0.0455 0.0542 -0.0608 0.1518 0.70 0.4017 
State*MAL Florida 1 0 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 . . 
State*MAL Illinois 0 1 -0.2701 0.0590 -0.3858 -0.1543 20.92 <.0001 
State*MAL Illinois 1 0 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 . . 
State*MAL Massachusetts 0 1 -0.4987 0.0627 -0.6216 -0.3758 63.26 <.0001 
State*MAL Massachusetts 1 0 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 . . 
State*MAL Nmex 0 1 -0.1714 0.1044 -0.3760 0.0331 2.70 0.1005 
State*MAL Nmex 1 0 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 . . 
State*MAL Nyork 0 1 -0.3088 0.0544 -0.4154 -0.2023 32.26 <.0001 
State*MAL Nyork 1 0 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 . . 
State*MAL Rhode Island 0 1 -0.2846 0.1093 -0.4988 -0.0704 6.78 0.0092 
State*MAL Rhode Island 1 0 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 . . 
State*MAL Wash 0 0 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 . . 
State*MAL Wash 1 0 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 . . 
Sex*MAL Females 0 1 0.1003 0.0264 0.0486 0.1520 14.47 0.0001 
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Analysis Of Maximum Likelihood Parameter Estimates 
Parameter   DF Estimate Standard 
Error 
Wald 95% 
Confidence 
Limits 
Wald 
Chi-
Square 
Pr > ChiSq 
Sex*MAL Females 1 0 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 . . 
Sex*MAL Males 0 0 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 . . 
Sex*MAL Males 1 0 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 . . 
Age_Group*MAL 30-34 yrs 0 1 -0.0358 0.0478 -0.1294 0.0578 0.56 0.4532 
Age_Group*MAL 30-34 yrs 1 0 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 . . 
Age_Group*MAL 35-39 yrs 0 1 0.0060 0.0473 -0.0868 0.0988 0.02 0.8989 
Age_Group*MAL 35-39 yrs 1 0 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 . . 
Age_Group*MAL 40-44 yrs 0 1 0.2620 0.0461 0.1716 0.3523 32.30 <.0001 
Age_Group*MAL 40-44 yrs 1 0 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 . . 
Age_Group*MAL 45-49 yrs 0 1 0.2929 0.0445 0.2058 0.3801 43.39 <.0001 
Age_Group*MAL 45-49 yrs 1 0 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 . . 
Age_Group*MAL 50-54 yrs 0 1 0.2119 0.0450 0.1237 0.3000 22.20 <.0001 
Age_Group*MAL 50-54 yrs 1 0 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 . . 
Age_Group*MAL 55-59 yrs 0 0 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 . . 
Age_Group*MAL 55-59 yrs 1 0 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 . . 
Scale     0 1.7527 0.0000 1.7527 1.7527     
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Figure 9a - Features of Medical Amnesty Laws from Nine States – Part 1 
 
STATE STATUTE Receiver of 
Immunity 
Overdose 
Substance  
Immunity 
provision 
regarding 
paraphernalia 
charges? 
Immunity 
provision 
regarding 
civil asset 
forfeiture? 
Immunity 
provision 
regarding 
Probation 
or parole 
violation? 
Colorado 18-1-711 (2018) caller and OD victim either drugs or 
alcohol 
yes no no 
Connecticut 21a-267 (2017) caller and OD victim either drugs or 
alcohol 
yes no no 
21a-279 (2017) caller and OD victim either drugs or 
alcohol 
no  no no 
Florida 893.21 (2018) caller and OD victim drugs no no no 
Illinois 720 ILCS 646/115 
(2018) 
caller and OD victim specific 
drug/combination  
no  no no 
720 ILCS 570/414 
(2018) 
caller and OD victim drugs no  no no 
Massachusetts Ch94C, Section 
34A (2017) 
caller and OD victim drugs no no no 
New Mexico 30-31-27.1 
(2018) 
caller and OD victim drugs no no no 
New York 
 
220.78 (2018) caller and OD victim either drugs or 
alcohol 
yes no no 
220.03 (2018) caller  either drugs or 
alcohol 
no  no no 
Rhode Island 21-28.8-4 (2018) caller and OD victim either drugs or 
alcohol 
yes no yes 
Washington 69.50.315 (2018) caller and OD victim drugs no  no no 
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Figure 9b - Features of Medical Amnesty Laws from Nine States – Part 2 
STATE STATUTE Is mitigation 
possible if 
full amnesty 
is not 
granted? 
Does 
Immunity 
require 
evidence 
from OD 
event? 
Immunity for 
certain 
distribution 
crimes? 
Specific 
requirem
ents to 
receive 
immunity
? 
Overdose 
Definition 
Provided? 
Number of 
other 
statutes 
referenced 
Colorado 18-1-711 
(2018) 
no provision yes drug only yes yes 6 
Connecticut 21a-267 
(2017) 
no provision yes no no no 2 
21a-279 
(2017) 
no provision yes no no no 2 
Florida 893.21 
(2018) 
no provision yes no no no 0 
Illinois 720 ILCS 
646/115 
(2018) 
no provision yes no no yes 0 
720 ILCS 
570/414 
(2018) 
no provision yes no no yes 0 
Massachu-
setts 
Ch94C, 
Section 34A 
(2017) 
mitigation 
for drug, not 
alcohol 
offenses 
yes no no no 3 
New Mexico 30-31-27.1 
(2018) 
mitigation 
for drug, not 
alcohol 
offenses 
yes no no no 1 
New York 220.78 
(2018) 
no provision yes yes no yes 5 
220.03 
(2018) 
no provision yes no no no 2 
Rhode 
Island 
21-28.8-4 
(2018) 
mitigation 
for drug, not 
alcohol 
offenses 
yes no no no 0 
Washington 69.50.315 
(2018) 
no provision yes no no no 2 
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CHAPTER 4 - PRACTICAL BARRIERS TO OBTAINING NALOXONE IN GEORGIA  
 
Study Title:  Barriers for Laypersons Wanting to Purchase Narcan® in Georgia 
 
Abstract 
 
BACKGROUND:  In Georgia, various legal measures have been enacted to make naloxone 
products like Narcan® more accessible to laypersons to combat the wave of opioid-related 
overdose deaths.  Now, laypersons may legally purchase naloxone products without a 
prescription for use during opioid-related overdose events.  This study sought to identify 
common barriers that still exist for the purchase of Narcan®, a nasally-administered form of 
naloxone. 
METHODS:  A randomized telephone survey of pharmacies was conducted in select counties 
with high drug poisoning deaths by volume and high overdose death rates compared to controls 
within the State of Georgia. Variables of interest included the current price, availability, and 
required documentation for purchase.  
RESULTS:  Slightly more than one-half of pharmacy representatives contacted stated they had 
Narcan® in stock at the time of contact.  Prices for Narcan® ranged from $65.00 to $201.00.  
Approximately one-half of the pharmacy representatives questioned stated that a physician’s 
prescription was required to purchase Narcan®, despite a Standing Order and a change in 
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Georgia law that removed this formerly mandated requirement.  Of representatives who stated 
that a prescription was not necessary, more than two-thirds described specific requirements for 
purchase of naloxone, such as the need to verify that opioid medication was prescribed for the 
potential overdose victim.   
CONCLUSIONS:  In Georgia, certain barriers to the purchase of Narcan® exist, making it less 
likely that those who may need a safe, easily administered form of naloxone will obtain the 
product.  An informational intervention is recommended. 
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Background  
 
Reports of the nation’s current drug overdose crisis are ubiquitous, although some states 
fare better than others.  For instance, from 2008 – 2014, Georgia’s annualized, age-adjusted 
poisoning death rate for all ages (11.82/100,000) is substantially less that the nationwide rate 
(14.45/100,000). 
ii
 Like many states, however, Georgia’s drug overdose death rates have risen 
each year.  From 2010 to 2017, Georgia’s overall drug poisoning deaths increased by 52%, while 
the population increased 7.6%.  
iii
   The characteristics of Georgia’s drug overdose deaths have 
also changed.  The percentage of opioid-related deaths among all drug overdose deaths increased 
from 40.1% in 2010 to 64.4% in 2017.  See Appendix Table 1.  Drug poisoning deaths are also 
distributed unevenly across Georgia: out of 159 counties, 42 reported higher poisoning death 
rates than the national average during 2008 - 2014.   Georgia’s most populous 20 counties 
account for more than 50% of all statewide drug poisoning deaths.  
iv
   
Understanding factors related to the distribution of drug overdose deaths in Georgia and 
elsewhere may help policymakers focus efforts on interventions that do the most good.  One 
strategy that has received wide support is to make naloxone products like Narcan®, an opioid 
antagonist drug, more available to those who may witness an overdose or come into contact with 
overdose victims.  The United States Surgeon General supports such a measure 
v
  as does the 
Georgia Department of Public Health (GADPH).  For example, the GADPH provides 
information on its webpage concerning “Emergency Help for Opioid Overdoses” with 
information on “Signs of Opioid Overdose”, and “How to Administer Naloxone”.  The website 
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also details how to use different Naloxone products, such as Narcan® and Evzio®, and how to 
recognize withdrawal symptoms.
vi
  The value of bystanders having access to naloxone has also 
been reported in the academic literature. (Davis, Webb, & Burris, 2013) 
Georgia policymakers have acted to remove previous barriers to laypersons acquiring 
Naloxone.  On January 12, 2017, Brenda C. Fitzgerald, Commissioner of Public Health and State 
Health Officer of the Georgia Department of Public Health, authorized the execution of a 
Standing Order that serves as a prescription for laypersons to obtain Naloxone from a licensed 
pharmacy.  The policy goal behind the Standing Order is stated clearly:  
“The purpose of this Standing Order is to facilitate the widest possible availability of 
Naloxone among the residents of this State, in order to ensure that family members, 
friends, co-workers, first responders, schools, pain management clinics, harm reduction 
organizations, and any other persons or entities (Eligible Persons or Entities) are in a 
position to provide assistance to person[s] experiencing an opioid-related overdose 
through the timely administration of the opioid antagonist Naloxone.” 
 
The Georgia General Assembly demonstrated its support of the Department of Public 
Health’s Standing Order by enacting O.C.G.A. § 26-4-116.2 (f), which requires that “Every 
pharmacy in this state shall retain a copy of the standing order issued under Code Section 31-1-
10” (Effective July 1, 2017). Lawmakers also amended Georgia’s Dangerous Drug Act (effective 
July 1, 2017) to exempt Naloxone from the list of drugs that require a physician’s prescription, if 
the Naloxone is used for drug overdose prevention and supplied by a dispenser in a specified 
manner. 
vii
  Thus, at the time of this study, Georgia pharmacists have authority that allows the 
dispensation of Naloxone products without a prescription from a physician.   
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Determining whether barriers continue to exist for those who wish to purchase naloxone 
may inform policymakers and assist in allocating resources for the best measures in combatting 
the opioid overdose crisis, designing more effective public service announcements, and adopting 
measures necessary to implement existing law.  Cressman, and others studied whether members 
of the Canadian public continued to have difficulty procuring naloxone despite legislation that 
made naloxone available without prescription.  (Cressman et al., 2017)  Those researchers 
utilized a cross-sectional study of Canadian pharmacists and found that only 24% had naloxone 
available and that availability varied significantly by region.  Further, nearly 1 in 7 pharmacists 
incorrectly stated that a prescription was required or were uncertain about whether one was 
required.  That research also reported that of those pharmacies with naloxone available when 
contacted, nearly half charged a fee, ranging from $25 to $200 (median cost was $50.00).   
This study sought to identify common barriers that still exist for the purchase of 
Naloxone products in Georgia.  We focused on Narcan®, a form of Naloxone that is 
administered intra-nasally and requires little training for its use, because we believe that most 
laypersons would prefer this form to injectable forms of Naloxone, and would be more likely to 
seek this nasal-spray form from a pharmacy. 
viii
  At least one study supports this view, 
ix
 plus the 
Georgia Department of Public Health encourages Georgians to purchase Narcan® through its 
website tagline, “Love an Addict? Carry Narcan.” 
x
  The lower price of Narcan® also makes it a 
more realistic product for the study of barriers to laypersons in purchasing Naloxone; Evzio®, an 
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auto-injectable brand described on the GADPH website, may cost several thousand dollars and 
thus be unaffordable for many. 
xi
 
 
Methodology   
 
Comparison between Georgia and nationwide drug poisoning deaths in 2016 
 
Using the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention Web-based Injury Statistics Query 
and Reporting System (WISQARS) systemxii, we generated fatal injury reports data that showed 
that in 2016 Georgia suffered 13.28/100,000 drug poisoning deaths, compared with 
19.73/100,000 nationwide.  
xiii
  Georgia’s metro areas suffered drug poisoning deaths of 
13.48/100,000 versus 12.32/100,000 for non-metro areas in the state. 
xiv
  Georgia’s metro areas 
comprise approximately 83% of the state’s total population.  Thus, exploring any existing 
differences in these more populous areas may prove helpful in addressing drug poisoning deaths.   
However, county-level data is not available from this CDC data base outside the years 2008 – 
2014. 
 
County-level data in Georgia to compare with nationwide drug poisoning deaths  
Using the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention Web-based Injury Statistics Query 
and Reporting System (WISQARS) system, Fatal Injury Data, Fatal Injury Maps 2008-2014, an 
age-adjusted map (2000 as the standard year) of poisoning deaths in Georgia at the county level 
was generated. (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, National Centers for Injury 
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Prevention and Control, 2005)   The available data does not delineate between drug poisoning 
deaths and other types of poisoning deaths, such as from unintentional exposure to toxic 
chemicals.  The annualized, age-adjusted poisoning death rate for Georgia was 11.82/100,000 
poisoning deaths for all ages, compared with a nationwide annualized, age-adjusted rate of 
14.45/100,000 for all ages, during 2008 – 2014.   
Georgia has 159 counties.  Of note, WISQARS only provides drug poisoning data for 76 
counties. Drug poisoning death data for the remaining 83 Georgia counties may be missing 
because of a data suppression rule that provides that no figure, including totals, less than 10 in 
tabulations for sub-national geographic areas, regardless of the number of years combined with 
the data from 2008 and later.   
Although Georgia exhibited a lower annualized, age-adjusted poisoning death rate for 
2008-2014 than the nationwide average, 42 Georgia counties reported higher poisoning death 
rates than the nationwide average.  Some Georgia counties, although not having death rates that 
exceeded the national average, contributed a large volume of poisoning deaths to the total 
number of deaths; twenty (20) counties had more than 100 total annual deaths on average for the 
time period 2008-2014.   
The focus of the study is on contacting pharmacies in county seats of those counties with 
poisoning deaths rates that exceed the nationwide average of 14.45/100,000 from 2008 – 2014 
(“high death rate counties”, n=42), and with more than 100 total annual deaths on average for the 
same period (“high death volume counties”, n=20).  Carroll, Bartow, Paulding, Whitfield, Floyd, 
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and Richmond Counties (n=6) fit into both the high death rate and the high death volume 
categories.  These 6 counties are included in the high death volume county list, but omitted from 
the high death rate county list to explore possible differences in drug poisoning deaths between 
metro and non-metro areas in Georgia.  Thus, 56 counties (“eligible counties”) fit either the high 
death rate county category, the high death volume category, or both.  Pharmacies from the 
remaining 20 counties in Georgia for which drug poisoning death data are available were 
randomly surveyed to acquire comparison statistics for the state.     
A list of pharmacies that service each county seat (largest city in each county) was 
obtained from Superpages.com, an online telephone and address directory which can be searched 
to provide pharmacy contact information by city. (superpages.com, n.d.)    Each pharmacy was 
numbered, and a random sequence generator used to select pharmacies for contact.  The question 
sequence was begun with the pharmacy representative who first answered the phone, and 
continued with subsequent representatives if the first respondent passed the call.  
Anticipated Complications 
Certain anticipated complications were addressed as follows: 
1. Pharmacies were included in the sampling frame only if they are located in Georgia.  It is 
unrealistic to expect pharmacists in adjoining states to be responsible for adhering to 
requirements for obtaining naloxone in Georgia.  For example, Fannin County borders 
Tennessee, yet fewer than half of the 137 pharmacies listed by Superpages.com that 
provide service to Blue Ridge, Georgia, (the county seat for Fannin County) are located 
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in Georgia.  Instead, the majority of pharmacies listed are located in nearby Chattanooga, 
Tennessee.  We recognize that Blue Ridge residents may be willing to travel to 
Tennessee to obtain naloxone.  However, expanding the survey to include pharmacies in 
other states would likely inject weaknesses into the study.  Georgia is surrounded by 
Tennessee, North Carolina, South Carolina, Florida, and Alabama, and dispensing 
requirements and pharmacy training may differ widely among these states.  Expanding 
the research to include pharmacies in these other states may result in the tabulation of 
dispensing requirements and policies irrelevant to the study. 
 
2. Some pharmacies appear on more than county’s list because some county seats are 
located close together.  The final lists for inclusion in this study omitted any repetition, 
such that each pharmacy location was listed once in the sampling frame and was 
available for random selection only one time.  For example, the cities of Toccoa 
(Stephens County) and Carnesville (Franklin County) are located approximately twenty 
miles apart.  Some pharmacies are listed on both the Toccoa (Stephens County) and 
Carnesville (Franklin County) lists.  Such pharmacies were included only one time in the 
sampling frame to ensure that each pharmacy had an equal probability for random 
selection.  This process is further supported by the belief that many people would be 
willing to travel to a nearby city to obtain important medication.  To further guard against 
multiple calls to the same pharmacy, the last 4 digits of phone numbers contacted were 
recorded in a database and then used to verify that new call attempts were unique.   
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3. The pharmacy directory service to be used, Superpages.com, often provides directory 
listings for individual pharmacy personnel in addition to pharmacy businesses.  Personnel 
listings were excluded, so that the final sampling frame included only pharmacy 
businesses that would likely be contacted by prospective customers for pricing, 
availability, and other purchase requirements concerning Narcan®. 
 
4. To avoid influencing the results of each call through the display of caller-identifying 
information, the lead author’s personal cell phone was used to make all calls to 
pharmacies rather than phones traceable to organizations through which the authors are 
affiliated, such as Georgia State University or the lead author’s law firm. 
 
From the sampling frame compiled, a total of 120 pharmacies were randomly selected without 
replacement and contacted by telephone during a two month period in Fall, 2018 as follows: 
 
1) High death rate counties (poisoning death rate exceeding 14.45/100,000) - 40 
pharmacies randomly selected without replacement (36 counties– 588 pharmacies). 
 
2) High death volume counties (more than 100 deaths from 2008 - 2014), 40 pharmacies 
randomly selected without replacement.  (20 counties – 843 pharmacies).  As noted 
elsewhere, 6 counties (Carroll, Bartow, Paulding, Whitfield, Floyd, and Richmond) 
qualify as either high death rate or high death volume counties.  These 6 counties are 
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included in the high death volume county list, but omitted from the high death rate county 
list.    
3) Comparison counties (neither high death rate nor high death volume), 40 pharmacies 
randomly selected to provide baseline data (20 counties - 335 pharmacies). 
 
We systematically contacted pharmacies in Georgia and asked pharmacy representatives a series 
of questions to test the following four (4) potential barriers to the acquisition of Narcan®: 
 
• Availability of Narcan®:  Do you have Narcan® nasal spray in stock?  
• Price of Narcan®: How much does it cost? 
• Awareness that Narcan® does not require a prescription: Can I buy it without a 
prescription? 
• Other barriers:  Are there any forms I have to fill out if I want to pay with cash? 
 
The Georgia State University Institutional Review Board designated this study as not Human 
Subject Research, therefore it was exempt from review.  
Results   
 
 Pharmacy representatives in all 120 pharmacies contacted provided responses for the 
survey.  The 120 pharmacies contacted constitute 6.8% of the total number of pharmacies 
(1,766) eligible for the study.    
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Whether Narcan® in stock and its price 
Of the pharmacy representatives questioned in High Rate counties, 55% stated that they 
had Narcan® in stock at the time of contact, compared with 64% of High Volume counties and 
62.5% of Comparison counties.  The average price for Narcan® in High Rate counties was 
$128.17 (Range:  71.69 to 180.00), compared with $133.40 (Range: 71.69 to 171.95) in High 
Volume counties, and$128.11 (Range: 65.00 to 201.00) in Comparison counties.  Prices of 
Narcan® in High Rate counties did not differ significantly from prices in Comparison counties 
(p = 0.99, alpha = 0.05).  Prices of Narcan® in High Volume counties did not differ significantly 
from prices in Comparison counties (p=0.46, alpha = 0.05)  Similarly, prices of Narcan® did not 
differ significantly between High Rate and High Volume counties. (p = 0.22, alpha = 0.05)   
Because one pharmacy representative in one High Volume county refused to answer 
whether Narcan® was in stock, this response was removed from the database for the purpose of 
determining whether county category and stock percentage were statistically independent.  A 
Chi-Square test was performed, which supported the null hypothesis that county category is 
statistically independent from having Narcan® in stock (p= 0.6753).  Therefore, there is not a 
significant difference among High Volume, High Rate, or Comparison counties in the price or 
availability of Narcan® among the pharmacies contacted, as presented in Table 1. 
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Table 1:  Results among Georgia counties by category: availability and price of Narcan®  
 Percentage in 
stock 
Average Price  
(low – high) 
Difference in price 
from Comparison 
Counties (p-value)* 
High Rate 
Counties 
N=40 
55% (22/40) 128.17 
(71.69 – 180.00) 
$0.06 (p=0.99) 
High Volume 
Counties  
N=40 
64% (25/39) 
(1 no answer) 
133.40  
(71.69 – 171.05) 
$5.29 (p=0.46) 
Comparison 
Counties 
N=40 
62.5% (25/40) 128.11  
(65.00 – 201.00) 
 
Total 
 
60.5%   
*2-tailed, two-sample T-test with equal variance (homoscedastic)  
Requirements to purchase Narcan® 
Slightly more than half the pharmacy representatives questioned in High Rate counties 
(51.3%) and High Volume counties (55%) stated that a physician’s prescription was not required 
for purchase of Narcan®, compared with 48.6% of those in Comparison counties.  Of those who 
stated that a prescription was not required, most described specific requirements for purchase of 
naloxone, such as the need to verify that opioid medication was prescribed for the potential 
overdose victim or the need to see identification such as a driver’s license and the need for a 
name and address from the purchaser (Table 2). 
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Table 2: Results among Georgia counties by category:  Whether prescription required and 
additional requirements for purchase of Narcan®  
 Accurate Requirement 
(n/%)Prescription  correct 
No additional requirements for 
purchase (among those 
answering prescription question 
correctly) 
High Rate 
Counties 
 
51.3%  
(20/39 – 1 no answer) 
37% (7/19) 
High Volume 
Counties  
55.9%  
(19/34 – 6 no answer) 
68% (13/19) 
Comparison 
Counties 
48.6% (18/37 – 3 no 
answer) 
33% (5/15) 
Total 
 
51.8% (57/110 – 10 no 
answer) 
47% (25/53) 
 
Because several pharmacy representatives refused to answer whether a prescription was 
required to purchase Narcan®, those responses were removed from the database for the purpose 
of determining whether county category and correct answers were statistically independent.  A 
Chi-Square test was performed, which supported the null hypothesis that county category is 
statistically independent from answering correctly that a doctor’s prescription is unnecessary for 
purchasing Narcan® (p= 0.8748).  Therefore, there is no significant difference among 
pharmacies contacted in High Volume, High Rate, or Comparison counties in answering 
correctly that a doctor’s prescription is unnecessary for purchasing Narcan®.   
Among those who answered that a doctor’s prescription was not required to purchase 
Narcan®, more than half either refused to answer or did not know whether additional 
requirements existed to purchase Narcan®.  These responses were removed from the database 
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for the purpose of determining whether county category and additional requirements were 
statistically independent.  A Chi-Square test was performed, which supported the null hypothesis 
that county category is statistically independent from imposing additional requirements for 
purchasing Narcan® (n = 53, p= 0.0669, alpha = 0.05).  Therefore, the evidence suggests no 
significant difference among pharmacies contacted in High Volume, High Rate, or Comparison 
counties in imposing additional requirements for purchasing Narcan®. 
The six counties that could be categorized as either High Volume or High Rate counties 
 
Of the 6 counties that could be included in either the high rate or high volume categories, 
a total of 157 pharmacies were listed in respective county seats.  Ten (10) pharmacies from these 
counties were among those randomly contacted.  We present the following summary statistics 
from these 6 counties in Table 3. 
Table 3:  Summary of results for 6 Georgia counties (Carroll, Bartow, Paulding, Whitfield, 
Floyd, and Richmond) that qualify as either “high rate” or “high volume” counties  
 
 
 
Narcan® in 
Stock 
Average Price 
(low – high) 
Prescription 
not required 
for purchase 
Additional 
requirements for 
purchase (among 
those answering 
prescription 
question 
correctly) 
Additional 
requirements for 
purchase 
6 special 
counties 
5/9; 1 N/A 
55.5% 
139.57 
(129.99 – 150.00) 
6/9 = 66.7% 
1 NA 
 3/4 
(2 no answer) 
75% 
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A comparison of features of the “6 special” counties with features of other county categories, the 
“6 special” counties are more similar to High Volume counties (the category in which they were 
assigned) in price and requirements for purchasing Narcan® than with either High Rate or 
Comparison Counties.  This supports the inclusion of these “6 special” counties within the High 
Volume county category rather than the High Rate county category.  However, there was a 
significant price difference between the “6 special” counties and other High Rate counties 
(p=0.033) and with other High Volume counties (p=0.043).  See Table 4. 
 
Table 4:  Summary of Results among all Georgia counties by category 
 
 
Narcan® in 
Stock 
Average Price 
(low – high) 
Price 
difference 
from Special 
6 counties 
Prescription 
not required 
for purchase 
of Narcan® 
Additional 
requirements for 
purchase of 
Narcan® (among 
those answering 
prescription 
question correctly) 
High Rate 
counties 
55% 128.17 
(71.69 – 180.00) 
(11.40)** 
p=0.033 
51.3% 66.7%  
(12/18 - 2 no 
answer) 
High Volume 
counties (w/ 
6 Special 
counties 
removed) 
64% 131.60  
(71.69 – 171.05) 
(7.97) 
p=0.11 
55.9% 77.7% (14/18 - 1 no 
answer) 
Comparison 
counties 
62.5% 128.11  
(65.00 – 201.00) 
(11.46)** 
p=0.043 
48.6% 75% (12/16 - 2 no 
answer) 
6 Special 
Counties
*
 
5/9; 1 N/A 
55.5% 
139.57 
(129.99 – 150.00) 
 6/9 = 66.7% 
1 NA 
 75% (3/4 - 2 no 
answer) 
* Summary of sub-analysis for 6 Georgia counties (Carroll, Bartow, Paulding, Whitfield, Floyd, 
and Richmond) that qualify as either “high rate” or “high volume” counties  
**Special 6 Counties vs. Comparison Counties: T-test p=0.043, one-tailed, unequal variance F-
test = 0.003 
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Special 6 Counties vs. High Rate Counties: T-test p=0.033, one-tailed, unequal variance F-test = 
0.007 
Special 6 Counties vs. High Volume Counties: T-test p=0.11, one-tailed, unequal variance F-test 
= 0.01 
 
Chain store status as confounder 
 
Additional analysis indicates that a potential confounder may be the influence of whether 
pharmacies contacted were part of a widely recognized chain store brand.  “Chain stores” are 
defined in this work as widely recognized brands with more than 350 locations in the United 
States.  Actual chain store names are on file with the lead author and are available upon request. 
More chain stores were represented among those pharmacies randomly selected than non-chain 
stores.  In High Rate counties, chain stores represented 52.5% (21 of 40), in High Volume 
counties, chain stores represented 65% (26 of 40), and in Comparison counties, chain stores 
represented 65% (26 of 40) of those pharmacies contacted.    
The average price of Narcan® was consistently lower in chain stores than in non-chain 
pharmacies across all county categories. In High Rate counties (overall average: $128.17), the 
average chain store price was $116.18 (Range:  $71.69 to $143.38), compared with the average 
non-chain pharmacy price of $148.15 (Range: $85.00 to $180.00).  In High Volume counties 
(overall average: $133.40), the average chain store price was $128.22 (Range:  $71.69 to 
$171.95), compared with the average non-chain pharmacy price of $151.18 (Range: $145.00 to 
$161.25).  In Comparison counties (overall average: $128.11), the average chain store price was 
$117.41 (Range:  $65.00 to $171.95), compared with the average non-chain pharmacy price of 
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$150.50 (Range: $131.59 to $201.00).  Differences between chain store pharmacies and non-
chain store pharmacies were statistically significant across all categories, with chain store prices 
being markedly lower.  See Table 5.   
Table 5:  Price of Narcan® among Georgia pharmacies sampled 
 Chain Store Non-chain Store Chain Store – Non-
chain Store Difference 
(P value) 
High Rate Counties 
 
(average: 128.17)  
 
2323.61/20 = 116.18 
1 no answer  
 
(Low: 71.69; High: 
143.38) 
1777.77/12= 148.15 
7 no answer  
 
(Low: 85.00; High: 
180.00) 
($31.97) 
F = 0.1055 
T-test (p<0.001) 
One-tailed, 2-sample 
with equal variance 
High Volume 
Counties 
 
(average: 133.40) 
 
3077.18/24 = 128.22 
2 no answer 
 
(Low: 71.69; High: 
171.95) 
1058.25/7 = 151.18 
7 no answer 
 
(Low: 145.00; High: 
161.25) 
($22.96) 
F = 0.0006 
T-test (p<0.001) 
One-tailed, 2-sample 
with unequal variance 
Comparison 
Counties 
 
(average: 128.11) 
2700.35/23 = 117.41 
3 no answer 
 
(Low: 65.00; High: 
171.95) 
1655.49/11 = 150.50 
3 no answer 
 
(Low: 131.59; High: 
201.00) 
($33.09) 
F=0.0723 
T-test (p=0.002) 
One-tailed, 2-sample 
with equal variance 
Overall Results 8101.14/67 = 120.91 
overall average for 
chain stores 
 
(Low: 65.00, High: 
171.95) 
4491.51/30 = 149.72 
overall average for 
non-chain stores 
 
(Low: 85.00, High 
201.00) 
($28.81) 
F-test = 0.000442 
T-test (p<.001) 
One-tailed, 2-sample, 
with unequal variance 
 
 
 
Across all three categories, chain stores consistently had Narcan® in stock more 
frequently than non-chain pharmacies.  In High Rate counties, 76.2% of chain store pharmacies 
had Narcan® in stock, compared with only 31.6% of non-chain pharmacies (overall average was 
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55%).  High Volume counties followed a similar pattern, with 76.9% of chain store pharmacies 
having Narcan® in stock versus 38.5% of non-chain stores (overall average was 64.1%).  In 
Comparison counties, 76.9% of chain stores had Narcan® in stock versus 35.7% of non-chain 
pharmacies.   
Because one pharmacy representative in one High Volume county refused to answer 
whether Narcan® was in stock, this response was removed from the database for the purpose of 
determining whether chain store status and stock percentage were statistically independent.  A 
Chi-Square test was performed, which supported the idea that there is an association between 
chain store and having Narcan® in stock (p< 0.001).   
Table 6:  Pharmacy answer characteristics stratified by chain store status 
 
 Narcan® in 
Stock 
Prescription not 
required for 
purchase of 
Narcan® 
No additional requirements 
for purchase of Narcan® 
(among those requiring 
prescription question)  
Chain Store 76.7% (56/73) 59.7% (43/72) 50.0% (20/40) 
Non-chain Store 34.7% (16/46) 37.8% (14/37) 38.5% (5/13) 
Overall 60.5% (72/119) 52.3%  (57/109) 47.2% (25/53) 
 
Because several pharmacy representatives refused to answer whether a prescription was 
required to purchase Narcan®, those responses were removed from the database for the purpose 
of determining whether county category and correct answers were statistically independent.  A 
Chi-Square test was performed, which supported idea that chain store status is associated with 
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answering correctly that a doctor’s prescription is unnecessary for purchasing Narcan® (p= 
0.03).  The Fisher’s exact test provides the same conclusion with a p-value of 0.0426.  Therefore, 
the evidence indicates a significant difference among chain store pharmacies and non-chain 
pharmacies contacted in answering correctly that a doctor’s prescription is unnecessary for 
purchasing Narcan®.   
Among those who answered that a doctor’s prescription was not required to purchase 
Narcan®, more than half either refused to answer or did not know whether additional 
requirements existed to purchase Narcan®.  These responses were removed from the database 
for the purpose of determining whether county category and additional requirements were 
statistically independent.  A Chi-Square test was performed, which supported the idea that no 
significant difference exists between chain stores and non-chain stores from imposing additional 
requirements for purchasing Narcan® (n = 53, p= 0.4691, alpha = 0.05).  The Fisher’s exact test 
provides the same conclusion with a p-value of 0.1963.  Therefore, the evidence indicates no 
significant difference among chain store pharmacies and non-chain pharmacies contacted in 
imposing additional requirements for purchasing Narcan®.   
 
Discussion 
 
Prices for Narcan® did not differ significantly between High Rate counties (average 
$128.17; Range:  71.69 to 180.00), High Volume counties (average $133.40; Range: 71.69 to 
171.95), or Comparison counties (average $128.11; Range: 65.00 to 201.00).  The lack of 
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differences in price may mean than the price of Narcan® has no differential effect among county 
types.  Such prices, however, likely make the purchase of Narcan® out of reach for many 
potential purchasers, especially among those who do not have health insurance or who are 
unwilling to submit such a pharmacy claim through existing insurance.  These prices may also 
reflect laws of supply and demand, or shelf space constraints within retail pharmacies, and thus 
may respond to policy efforts to subsidize the purchase of Narcan®.   
As noted, 55 % of pharmacies in High Rate counties had Narcan® in stock at the time of 
contact, compared with 64% of pharmacies in High Volume counties and 62.5% of those in 
Comparison counties.  One explanation may be higher turnover of inventory because of higher 
sales of prices of Narcan® in High Rate counties.  Further research may determine whether 
naloxone sales in high rate counties differ from other counties in Georgia and whether demand 
for Narcan® or other naloxone products outpaces supply.   
Despite current legal measures designed to increase availability of Naloxone by removing 
the requirement for a prescription, barely more than half the pharmacy representatives 
questioned in High Rate counties (51.3%) or High Volume counties (55%) correctly stated that a 
physician’s prescription was not required for purchase of naloxone nasal spray, compared with 
48.6% of those in Comparison counties.  Of pharmacy representatives who correctly stated that a 
prescription was not required, most described specific requirements for purchase of naloxone, 
such as the need to verify that opioid medication was prescribed for the potential overdose victim 
or the need to see identification such as a driver’s license and the need for a name and address 
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from the purchaser.  This may reflect a lack of knowledge about the current state of Georgia law, 
or it may relate more to pharmacy policies.  Pharmacies have certain restrictions and policies 
governing drug dispensation, even with a prescription, and pharmacists may even refuse to fill a 
prescription on moral grounds. Policies that require a physician’s prescription run counter to the 
stated goal of the Standing Order, and the current policy goals of the Georgia General Assembly, 
and the United States Surgeon General.  Whether or not non-chain pharmacy policies differ from 
chain store pharmacy policies surrounding dispensation of Narcan® may be the subject of further 
research.   
We postulate that a certain amount of stigma surrounds the purchase of Narcan® even if 
purchased for a legal and legitimate purpose such as the rescue of a third person.  Some people 
may not wish to be seen purchasing Naloxone products by friends, co-workers, acquaintances, or 
others, because of its close association with drug overdoses, which are in turn often associated 
with illegal drug use or drug addiction.  Some may not wish to pursue reimbursement for such a 
purchase through a health insurance provider, out of fear of rate increases, denial of coverage, or 
some other carryover effect. 
Discomfort with possessing or purchasing Naloxone may be well-founded.  Some 
research has indicated that ancillary problems may accompany possessing naloxone, such as 
confrontations with police, first responders, shelters, or treatment programs because subjects 
possessed naloxone. (Clark, Wilder, & Winstanley, 2014) (Enteen et al., 2010; Galea et al., 2006; 
Lankenau et al., 2013) (Doe-Simkins, Walley, Epstein, & Moyer, 2009; Piper et al., 2008; 
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Wagner et al., 2010)  Some individuals may thus prefer to obtain naloxone discretely, to avoid 
embarrassment or revealing the presence of a narcotics addiction to others.   
Pharmacy policies exist that will impose restrictions on the purchase of naloxone, such as 
requiring a prescription despite the current state of the law or requiring a purchaser to fill out a 
form that requests personal information.  Anecdotally, a recent news story by CNN reported 
about a Walgreens pharmacist who refused to fill a woman’s prescription to induce a miscarriage 
on moral grounds.  
xv
  Barriers to the purchase of naloxone products like Narcan® make it less 
likely that those who may need a safe, easily administered form of naloxone will seek to obtain 
the product.  Of note, the six “special counties” that could qualify as either High Rate or High 
Volume counties exhibit some differences, but low counts limit further statistical analysis.   
Chain store status as confounder   
 The most surprising results concerned the differences between chain store pharmacies 
(with more than 350 stores nationwide) and smaller, non-chain pharmacies.  Chain store 
pharmacies had significantly lower average prices ($120.91 vs. 149.72; p<0.001) and had higher 
stock rates of Narcan® (76.6% vs. 34.7%, p<0.001).  Chain store representatives were also 
significantly more likely to accurately state that a physician’s prescription was not required to 
purchase Narcan® (59.7% vs. 37.8%, p<0.001). Chain store representatives were also 
significantly less likely to state that additional measures were required for the purchase of 
Narcan®, such as providing photo identification or verifying the existence of an opioid-
containing prescription (50.0% vs. 38.5%, p<0.001).  Whether or not these differences reflect 
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more accurate knowledge of the law or differences in store policies may be a subject for further 
research.   
Limitations 
 This work has two notable strengths: the sample size of 120 of pharmacies across 
Georgia represents approximately 6.8% of the total number of pharmacies in the eligible 
counties, and is a higher percentage of pharmacies than a similar sample of pharmacies in 
Canada conducted by Cressman (Cressman et al., 2017).  Further, 100% of pharmacy 
representatives contacted provided responses. 
A number of factors exist that may limit the applicability of this study.  Pricing does not 
account for insurance payment, although some may prefer not to file a claim for insurance 
reimbursement for reasons mentioned elsewhere.  Data used for dividing counties by category 
were drawn from CDC data, which was limited to 2008-2014, while different rates may exist 
today.  As mentioned elsewhere, Georgia has 159 counties, yet only 76 counties had data 
available for this research.  Counties with unreported or suppressed data may be different from 
those counties with reported data.  Naloxone may be available through other routes, such as harm 
reduction sites not considered by this research.  We also assumed that county seats are 
representative of whole county, which may or may not be entirely accurate.  Pharmacies may 
also serve residents from “high volume” locations like Macon or “high rate” locations and also 
residents from nearby “comparison” counties, which may skew the results.  Some individuals 
may prefer to drive out of state to purchase Narcan®, and therefore use a pharmacy not eligible 
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for this study.  Recorded responses were limited to knowledge and honesty of individual 
respondents and may vary from other pharmacy representatives at the same location.  Future 
research may include interventions to better inform pharmacists of current law, reduce prices, 
increase the available supply of Narcan® and address the stigma that co-exists with the purchase 
of Narcan®.  Pharmacy representatives should be trained to provide professional, accurate 
responses concerning this important naloxone product. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In Georgia, certain barriers to the purchase of Narcan® exist, making it less likely that 
those who may need a safe, easily administered form of naloxone will obtain the product.   
Pricing and availability constraints may prevent or restrain individuals from purchasing 
naloxone.  Further, onerous dispensing requirements may also dissuade individuals from 
purchasing naloxone.  The more barriers that exist, the less likely individuals will obtain 
naloxone products to store for emergency use.  To the extent that higher prices, lower 
availability, and pharmacy policies make layperson purchase of naloxone more difficult, fewer 
will make such a purchase.   
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Appendix - Chapter 4 – Practical Barriers to Obtaining Naloxone in Georgia 
 
 
Table 1 - Georgia - percentage of opioid-related deaths among all drug overdose deaths 
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Figure 1 – All Georgia Counties with Data Available  
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Figure 2 – Georgia Counties with Relevant Drug Poisoning Rates 
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Figure 3 – Comparison of Study Selected Counties and Counties with any Opioid-Involved 
Overdose Emergency Department Visit and Hospitalization 
 
 
 
Table 2 – County Categories for Inclusion in Study 
Category Georgia 
County 
Population Deaths Age-
adjusted 
Rate per 
100,000; 
unsmoothed 
County Seat 
High death rate 
counties 
(>14.45/100,000 
poisoning deaths 
for 2008-2014) 
 
36 Counties, 
TOWNS 
FANNIN 
MURRAY 
FRANKLIN 
74214 
165230 
276915 
154678 
23 
48 
82 
42 
36.96523 
36.95304 
29.79573 
29.58093 
Hiawassee 
Blue Ridge 
Chatsworth 
Carnesville 
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588 pharmacies JEFF DAVIS 
HARALSON 
RABUN 
STEPHENS 
WHITE 
CARROLL* 
MADISON 
WAYNE 
WARE 
CATOOSA 
BRANTLEY 
WALKER 
BUTTS 
JACKSON 
DAWSON 
POLK 
PICKENS 
ELBERT 
CHATTOOGA 
BARTOW* 
PAULDING* 
PIERCE 
GORDON 
GILMER 
BARROW 
104584 
200225 
114006 
180799 
191450 
779858 
196504 
210890 
251572 
451843 
127985 
478808 
164737 
423821 
156804 
288988 
206794 
139346 
179495 
702123 
1005214 
131029 
387823 
198578 
489959 
30 
60 
28 
41 
39 
169 
44 
45 
54 
93 
24 
90 
35 
84 
30 
55 
38 
26 
35 
125 
183 
22 
65 
30 
82 
29.34592 
29.03319 
26.03969 
23.74747 
22.78253 
22.44246 
22.35197 
21.82538 
21.36512 
21.0085 
20.27053 
20.05965 
19.82342 
19.62884 
19.61228 
19.23711 
18.9254 
18.48645 
18.36627 
17.98511 
17.74205 
17.66843 
16.96612 
16.84572 
16.77498 
Hazelhurst 
Buchanan 
Clayton 
Toccoa 
Cleveland 
Carrollton 
Danielsville 
Jesup 
Waycross 
Ringgold 
Nahunta 
La Fayette 
Jackson 
Jefferson 
Dawsonville 
Cedartown 
Jasper 
Elberton 
Summerville 
Cartersville 
Dallas 
Blackshear 
Calhoun 
Elijay 
Winder 
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LUMPKIN 
WHITFIELD* 
SPALDING 
UPSON 
COFFEE 
FLOYD* 
HART 
PEACH 
GLYNN 
WALTON 
RICHMOND* 
TROUP 
PUTNAM 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
212104 
717046 
447505 
188170 
298255 
672958 
177300 
191305 
561469 
592633 
1402666 
474047 
148396 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
34 
112 
73 
29 
46 
104 
27 
25 
81 
91 
203 
68 
22 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
16.53837 
16.29824 
16.26202 
16.00388 
15.51988 
15.41455 
15.30929 
15.23904 
15.22088 
15.1097 
14.9688 
14.50411 
14.49303 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dahlonega 
Dalton 
Griffin 
Thomaston 
Douglas  
Rome 
Hartwell 
Fort Valley 
Brunswick 
Monroe 
Augusta 
LaGrange 
Eatonton 
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High death 
volume 
counties (>100 
deaths for 2008-
2014) 
 
 
20 counties/843 
pharmacies 
CARROLL* 
BARTOW* 
PAULDING* 
WHITFIELD* 
FLOYD* 
RICHMOND* 
HALL 
HENRY 
CHEROKEE 
FULTON 
FORSYTH 
MUSCOGEE 
COBB 
DOUGLAS 
COWETA 
CHATHAM 
BIBB 
CLAYTON 
GWINNETT 
DE KALB 
 
779858 
702123 
1005214 
717046 
672958 
1402666 
1282022 
1438340 
1529387 
6624135 
1283674 
1363596 
4907583 
935745 
904250 
1893038 
1085639 
1842871 
5784398 
4911550 
 
 
169 
125 
183 
112 
104 
203 
179 
201 
201 
877 
154 
160 
629 
112 
105 
210 
109 
163 
427 
361 
 
22.44246 
17.98511 
17.74205 
16.29824 
15.41455 
14.9688 
14.38339 
13.76811 
13.34801 
12.6505 
12.45085 
12.31633 
12.24573 
11.92685 
11.79587 
11.03353 
10.50239 
9.085256 
7.315252 
6.935566 
 
 
Carrollton 
Cartersville 
Dallas 
Dalton 
Rome 
Augusta 
Gainesville 
McDonough 
Canton 
Atlanta 
Cumming 
Columbus 
Marietta 
Douglasville 
Newnan 
Savannah 
Macon 
Jonesboro 
Lawrenceville 
Decatur 
 
Comparison counties: 20 
remaining counties that did not 
meet either high death rate or high 
death volume category that 
reported number of deaths 
 
335 pharmacies 
10023647 
 
 
993 
 
10.94   
Unweighted 
average 
 
 
83 remaining counties that did not 
meet either high death rate or high 
death volume category that did 
not report number of deaths 
  8309644 
 
 
 
 
Did not 
report 
  
Total population of Georgia 23357499 
 
   
All data downloaded from cdc.com WISQARS 6/28/18.  
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Age-adjusted Death Rates per 100,000 Population; Standard Year = 2000. 
Poisoning, All Intents, All Races, All Ethnicities, Both Sexes, All Ages 
Annualized Age-adjusted Rate for Georgia: 11.82 
Reports include unknown ages. 
Table 3 - Georgia – Percent of opioid-related deaths among all drug overdose deaths 2010 - 2017 
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CHAPTER 5 – DISSERTATION SUMMARY and FUTURE DIRECTIONS IN 
RESEARCH 
 
Most policy efforts to address overdose deaths have focused on either supply side 
measures or demand side measures.  Supply side measures include law enforcement pressure on 
drug distribution, possession, and use, Prescription Drug Monitoring Programs (PDMP), 
regulating pharmaceutical manufacturers/distributors of drugs which could then be diverted to 
illegal or non-prescribed uses, monitoring medical professionals/doctors/dentists/pharmacists for 
overprescribing or over-dispensing, and providing education programs in schools and elsewhere.  
However, supply-side measures often shift demand from certain drugs to other drugs less 
affected by such measures.   
Demand side measures include education policies in schools, public health messages, 
treatment for chemical dependency, and the use of probation/parole to mandate chemical 
dependency evaluations and treatment.  The lag between such efforts and any reduction in 
demand of drugs can be difficult to measure. 
In contrast to strictly supply-side or demand-side drug policies, this dissertation focuses 
on the point of overdose and what happens immediately thereafter.  Policies that address the 
point of overdose include education concerning recognizing overdose, learning to treat overdose, 
and learning the importance of seeking professional help.  Other measures include distributing 
naloxone to first responders, police, and other officials likely to be present and available to treat 
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an overdose victim.  Still other measures include providing naloxone to laypersons, which 
necessitates appropriate training and assurances of protection from civil or criminal liability.   
Typical responses to overdose by non-professionals are depicted below, and can be 
charted on a continuum that involves seeking no professional assistance (from first responders, 
an emergency department, police, doctors, etc.) to fully seeking professional assistance.  
Increasing contact between persons suspected of overdose and medical professionals will more 
likely save lives.  To the extent that the public, including drug users, are encouraged to seek 
professional assistance during suspected overdose events, overdose victims stand a better chance 
at surviving the event and ultimately receiving long-term help for drug or alcohol abuse issues.   
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What often occurs, however, is individuals will fail to immediately seek professional 
assistance during an overdose event.  Bystanders and/or the overdose victim may attempt first 
aid measures, such as slapping the victim, splashing water, or trying to revive the overdose 
victim in other ways.  Bystanders may call a friend to ask for assistance or advice.  More 
recently, naloxone may be available for use with an overdose victim.  Even if effective, the 
overdose victim should still see a medical professional, as the effect of naloxone wears off.   
Some bystanders undertake half-measures when dealing with an overdose, such as 
telephoning 9-1-1 to report a possible drug overdose but then leaving the overdose victim in a 
public location.  This is problematic, because the victim may not be readily located by first 
responders.  Further, first responders may not be informed about what potential intoxicants the 
victim received.  More responsible bystanders will communicate quickly and fully with 
authorities, and provide information concerning the location, status, and possible substances 
consumed.   
The crux of the issue is how to appropriately encourage bystanders to overdose to behave 
responsibly and quickly.  Many distrust police involvement, and hesitate to contact authorities 
because they fear police.  Some research disputes this notion, but other research highlights 
concerns about contacting authorities, harassment from first responders.  Moreover, drug induced 
homicide statutes in some states, reports of felony murder prosecutions, DFACS investigations, 
contacting probation officers, and other measures intensify the fears of some people.  Statutes 
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that provide immunity from criminal action can have an important impact on the likelihood of 
seeking treatment.  
 Medical amnesty laws are designed to alleviate these fears and are therefore critical to 
the success of any program designed to save lives by preventing overdose deaths.  For this 
reason, this dissertation focuses on those measures most likely to immediately save lives during 
overdose.  Importantly, this work does not focus on only one class of substance, such as opioids.  
Rather, the work is meaningful for any substance.  During our nation’s history, we have 
experienced overdose epidemics on different classes of drugs and, as noted above, as supply-side 
measures exert pressure on a given class of drugs, users will often switch to another class.  An 
example concerns the recent opioid overdose epidemic, which began as a prescription drug 
epidemic.  Law enforcement attention and PDMP’s and other measures have exerted pressure on 
the diversion of prescription drugs, leading to the more widespread use of heroin.  Pressure on 
heroin has caused some drug users to more recently switch to methamphetamine.  Much of the 
work presented in this dissertation applies directly to an overdose involving any substance. 
The three studies outlined in this dissertation address different, but interconnected, facets 
of combating drug poisoning deaths.  The first study surveys medical amnesty laws nationwide 
in an effort to provide baseline data on existing statutory provisions.  The second study measures 
the efficacy of MALs by analyzing the four states with the longest history of MALs:  
Connecticut, New Mexico, New York, and Washington.  The third study examines barriers that 
may make purchasing Narcan® more difficult in Georgia.  An examination of price, availability, 
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and pharmacy policies that may discourage the discrete purchase of Narcan® may illustrate 
barriers not addressed by legislation.   
 Determining how to appropriately encourage bystanders to overdose to behave 
responsibly and quickly is critical.  Many distrust police involvement, and hesitate to contact 
authorities because they fear police.  Statutes that provide immunity from criminal action can 
have an important impact on the likelihood of seeking treatment.  
 Medical amnesty laws are designed to alleviate these fears and are therefore critical to 
the success of any program designed to save lives by preventing overdose deaths.  For this 
reason, this dissertation focuses on those measures most likely to immediately save lives during 
overdose.  Importantly, this work does not focus on only one class of substance, such as opioids.  
Rather, the work is meaningful for any substance.  During our nation’s history, we have 
experienced overdose epidemics on different classes of drugs and, as noted above, as supply-side 
measures exert pressure on a given class of drugs, users will often switch to another class of 
drugs. 
  Except for the pharmacy study, presented as the second paper in this series, this 
dissertation work applies directly to overdoses involving any type of substance.  The pharmacy 
study fits within the dissertation work because of the currently increasing importance of opioid 
overdose deaths in Georgia.  From 2010 to 2017, drug poisoning deaths from any drug increased 
in Georgia by approximately 52%.  During the same period, the percentage of opioid-related 
overdose deaths increased from approximately 40% to nearly 65%.  See Appendix, Figure 8.  
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Failing to address the increasing importance of the opioid class of drugs in drug poisoning deaths 
would omit an important piece in the overall picture.   
The first paper focuses on identifying existing features of MALs and advocating for those 
statutory provisions most likely to be effective at encouraging bystanders and overdose victims 
to contact authorities during overdose events.  This work is critical to understanding how best to 
affect policy so that policymakers can be equipped with the tools necessary to write the most 
effective legislation possible.   
The second paper seeks to determine whether medical amnesty laws are, in fact, working.  
While impossible to know precisely to what extent they may be working, legislators and policy 
makers should be made aware that the battle to inform the public is not over.  Perhaps 
Washington’s success may be attributed to educational campaigns in that state to disseminate 
information about medical amnesty laws.  Future studies may examine public education efforts 
in different states to determine which efforts inform the public best. 
The third paper suggests that barriers to the purchase of Narcan®, a popularly used form 
of naloxone, still exist in Georgia despite legal measures to make purchasing naloxone products 
easier for laypersons.  Barriers that exist are less likely to be found in chain store pharmacies 
(those with more than 350 stores nationwide) that in smaller pharmacies.  Barriers do exist: 
prices are high, stock rates of Narcan® are intermittent, and pharmacy representatives routinely 
describe requirements to purchasing Narcan® that are no longer required by law.   
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Fully addressing the current drug overdose crisis in the United States will not be 
accomplished with a single approach.  Rather, policy makers should consider a range of multi-
disciplinary approaches designed to educate and equip citizens and professionals everywhere 
with the knowledge of what to do during an overdose event.  Acting swiftly and decisively 
during such an emergency will save lives, and that is the focus of this dissertation.  
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Chapter 3 - Endnotes 
                                                          
i
 In 2010, Georgia overall drug poisoning deaths totaled 1,062 out of a population of 9,687,653 
(10.96 per 100,000), while in 2017, drug poisoning deaths totaled 1,619 out of a population of 
10,429,379 (15.52 per 100,000).  Thus, overall drug poisoning deaths increased by 52%, while 
Georgia’s population increased 7.6% from 2010 to 2017 (rate increase is 41.6%). Georgia 
Department of Public Health;  https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/ga/POP010210, 
accessed 12/13/18; https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/ga, accessed 12/13/18. 
ii
 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention WISQARS system *** 
iii
 In 2010, Georgia overall drug poisoning deaths totaled 1,062 out of a population of 9,687,653 
(10.96 per 100,000), while in 2017, drug poisoning deaths totaled 1,619 out of a population of 
10,429,379 (15.52 per 100,000).  Thus, overall drug poisoning deaths increased by 52%, while 
Georgia’s population increased 7.6% from 2010 to 2017 (rate increase is 41.6%). Georgia 
Department of Public Health;  https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/ga/POP010210, 
accessed 12/13/18; https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/ga, accessed 12/13/18. 
iv
 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention WISQARS system 
v
 Surgeon general advocates for the acquisition and storage of naloxone for easy use. 
• https://www.surgeongeneral.gov/priorities/opioid-overdose-prevention/naloxone-
advisory.html 
 
vi
 Georgia Department of Public Health Website:   
“How to Administer Naloxone” – page 10 
“Love an Addict?  Carry Narcan”Source:  
https://dph.georgia.gov/sites/dph.georgia.gov/files/Administer%20Naloxone.pdf downloaded 
10/13/18. 
 
vii
  Under O.C.G.A. § 16-13-71, a "Dangerous drug" is defined as: (a) A "dangerous drug" means 
any drug other than a drug contained in any schedule of Article 2 of this chapter, which, under 
the federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (52 Stat. 1040 (1938)), 21 U.S.C. Section 301, et seq., 
as amended, may be dispensed only upon prescription. 
HB 249:  SECTION 1-4 was signed by Governor May 4, 2017, and became effective on July 1, 
2017.  H.B. 249 amended O.C.G.A. § 16-13-71 (c), relating to the definition of a dangerous 
drug, to read as follows: 
• "(14.25) Naloxone ̶ shall also be exempt from subsections (a) and (b) of this Code section 
when used for drug overdose prevention and when supplied by a dispenser as follows:  
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(A) Nasal adaptor rescue kits containing a minimum of two prefilled 2 ml. luer-lock syringes 
with each containing 1 mg./ml. of naloxone; 
(B) Prepackaged nasal spray rescue kits containing single-use spray devices with each containing 
a minimum of 4 mg./0.1 ml. of naloxone; 
(C) Muscle rescue kits containing a 10 ml. multidose fliptop vial or two 1 ml. vials with a 
strength of 0.4 mg./ml. of naloxone; or 
(D) Prepackaged kits of two muscle auto-injectors with each containing a minimum of 0.4 
mg./ml. of naloxone;" 
 
viii
 Narcan® is distributed by Adapt Pharma, Inc., Radner, PA., 19087, USA nationwide.    
ix
 people prefer non-injectable over injectable forms of naloxone 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.addbeh.2018.03.011 
 
x
 :   https://dph.georgia.gov/sites/dph.georgia.gov/files/Administer%20Naloxone.pdf downloaded 
10/13/18. 
xi
  Priced at $3,732 (at Winn Dixie, Costco, Fred’s Pharmacy) to $4,043 (at Kmart) according to 
GoodRx.com, accessed on 10/14/18. 
 
 
xiii
 Georgia had 1,394 drug poisoning deaths from a population of 10,310,371 (age-adjusted rate 
with 2000 as standard year of 13.28 per 100,000) for all races, both sexes, and all ages (ICD-10 
Codes: X40-44. X60-64, X85, Y10-Y14).  This compares with 63,632 such deaths nationwide 
that same year, from a United States population of 323,127,513, for an age-adjusted rate of 19.73 
per 100,000).  CDC, WISQARS. 
xiv
  Using the 2013 Urbanization (collapsed) Classification (standard population is 2000, all 
races, both sexes), Georgia metro areas suffered 1,178 drug poisoning deaths from a population 
of 8,532,248 (age-adjusted rate of 13.48 per 100,000) and non-metro areas suffered 216 deaths 
from a population of 1,778,123, for an age-adjusted rate of 12.32 per 100,000.   
 
xv
 Walgreens pharmacist refuses to fill woman’s prescription to induce a miscarriage.  CNN. 
June 25, 2018.  https://www.cnn.com/2018/06/25/health/arizona-prescription-walgreens-
miscarriage/index.html  
